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The Twice-Told Tale of Mr. Fixit:
Reflections on the Brandeis/Frankfurter
Connection
The Brandeis/Frankfurter Connection. By Bruce Allen Murphy.
New York: Oxford University Press, 1982. Pp. x, 473. $18.95.
David Lubant
By now, Yale Law Journal readers are familiar with this book; it has
been serialized in the Washington Post,' editorialized about in the New
York Times,2 reported in numerous other newspapers and magazines, and
fiercely rebutted by Professor Robert Cover in The New Republic.3 Louis
D. Brandeis and Felix Frankfurter, according to Professor Bruce Allen
Murphy, engaged in nonstop and semi-secret "extrajudicial political activ-
ities" throughout their tenures on the Supreme Court. Most notably,
Brandeis provided funds to enable Frankfurter-then a Harvard law pro-
fessor-to lobby for Brandeis's private political agenda.
I read the Washington Post excerpts each day during early morning
coffee, right after Doonesbury and Mary Worth. Doonesbury, some time
around then, did very funny things with Alexander Haig's "demonstra-
tions" of the Soviet Union/Nicaragua connection. And Mary's schizo-
phrenic new tenant had distinct public and private identities. Each bit of
his behavior was innocuous, but the whole pattern was sinister. The
t Research Associate, Center for Philosophy and Public Policy, University of Maryland at Col-
lege Park, and School of Law, University of Maryland at Baltimore.
1. Wash. Post, Feb. 21, 1982, at Al, col. 1; id., Feb. 22, 1982, at Al, col. 4; id., Feb. 23, 1982, at
A2, col. 1.
2. Judging Judges, and History, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1982, at A22, col. 1; Margolick, Letters
Show Frankfurter a Secret Voice of Brandeis, N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1982, at Al, col. 1. For a detailed
discussion of the Times's overstatement of Murphy's theses, see Cover, The Framing of Justice Bran-
deis, NEW REPUBLIC, May 5, 1982, at 17-18.
3. Cover, supra note 2, at 17.
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Brandeis/Frankfurter Connection combined elements of both.
Like Trudeau's Haig, Professor Murphy finds the most conspiratorial
reading of every incident, invariably expressing himself in language that is
tendentious and question-begging: letters and conversations are "marching
orders"; 4 Frankfurter was "Brandeis's own surrogate," 5 his "operator in
the field,"' his "fifty-year old lieutenant";7 Frankfurter's "tentacles were
known to reach into very nearly every government agency."" Often, as we
shall see, Murphy's interpretations outstrip the evidence he adduces, and
he sensationalizes the material with editorializing almost as much as the
New York Times, in a bit of unintended poetic justice, did to Murphy's
own conclusions.
Out of his hundreds of sources, Murphy has nevertheless pieced to-
gether a cogent and interesting story. Professor Cover, pointing to several
errors, claims that the book is "shoddy scholarship,"9 but this is not obvi-
ously so. Murphy undertook a large research task,10 and the particular
errors noted by Cover appear merely to be the inevitable lapses of an
historian juggling thousands of bits of information. Exaggerated as Mur-
phy's account appears to be, it is clear that the Brandeis/Frankfurter con-
nection was not nothing; their politicking cannot be conjured away.
But the question, familiar to devotees of Mary Worth, lingers: "What
is so sinister about what they did?"
I. The Three Arguments
Murphy raises or implies three criticisms:
1. The Brandeis/Frankfurter activities violated the separation of pow-
ers principle, which requires that the branches of government be insulated
from each other. Murphy, in his temperate moments, claims to be raising
this as a question rather than a charge.11 In other places, he gives a differ-
ent impression: "[A]ttacks [on judges for overstepping their limits] by
those crying to save the separation of powers are hardly new, but they are
nonetheless compelling." 2 Brandeis "praised the American democracy for
4. B. MURPHY, THE BRANDEIS/FRANKFURTER CONNECTION 104, 191, 235 (1982) [hereinafter
cited by page number only].
5. P. 53.
6. P. 92.
7. P. 99. "Lieutenant" is one of Murphy's favorite characterizations of the associates of both
Justices.
8. P. 243.
9. Cover, supra note 2, at 17.
10. His list of sources includes 22 interviews, 53 sets of unpublished papers, 39 oral histories, 20
unpublished studies and a 10-page list of published books and articles; the book contains 87 pages of
footnotes.
11. Pp. 11, 14-15, 342-44.
12. P. 13.
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its separation-of-powers concept. This .. .is particularly interesting in
light of Brandeis's later political behavior while serving on the Court.""3
2. Brandeis and Frankfurter were hypocrites. While carrying on their
activities, they "carefully nurtured" an image of political noninvolve-
ment;14 they made "Ophelia-like protests"15 of their political innocence;
Frankfurter was "no Reverend Dimmesdale," 16 for his "overt displays of
hypocrisy were . . . much a part of his personality." ' Murphy's case for
the charge of hypocrisy is overwhelming (though the malady, by his ac-
count, was much more acute in Frankfurter than in Brandeis).
3. Brandeis's and Frankfurter's political activities jeopardized the au-
thority of the Court: "For if the Court is to serve the necessary societal
function of resolving disputes among its citizenry, and thereby defusing
much potential for violence and anarchy, it must avoid activities that risk
seriously damaging the expectation that the courts will dispense justice
without fear or favor." ' "Much like Caesar's wife, a Supreme Court jus-
tice must do more than refrain from personal involvement in political alli-
ances; he or she must be perceived by the public as incapable of having
considered such involvement in the first place.""9 In other words, Justices
must avoid not merely impropriety, but the very appearance of
impropriety.2 °
This is an interesting argument which, curiously enough, seems to run
counter to the previous criticism of Brandeis and Frankfurter. For it sug-
gests that the public confidence necessary to keep the Court viable re-
quires Justices to pretend an indifference to political matters that few who
have aspired to and attained the Supreme Bench can reasonably be ex-
pected to possess. Thus, the argument taken to its logical conclusion de-
mands that irrepressibly political Justices be hypocrites.
This might suggest that Brandeis and Frankfurter were doing just the
right thing by leading their political lives in secret. But Murphy adds an
additional twist: since it is virtually impossible to keep secrets in govern-
ment, the only way to guarantee the appearance of apoliticality is by actu-
ally being apolitical.21 Apolitical behavior is thus commended on the
purely instrumental ground that it is the best warranty of the appearance









21. Pp. 14-15, 343-44.
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cism about whether the Brandeis/Frankfurter activities were in absolute
terms improper with the strong suggestion that even an erroneous public
belief in their impropriety would suffice to make them improper.
These, then, are the arguments we must consider: the Separation-of-
Powers Argument, the Hypocrisy Argument, and the Caesar's Wife
Argument.
II. The Separation-of-Powers Argument
If we mean by "separation of powers" the formal arrangement that
prevents one branch of government from usurping the legitimate functions
of another, then the Brandeis/Frankfurter activities did not violate this
principle of government. First of all, neither Brandeis nor Frankfurter
acted as Justices when they lobbied, and-with one possible exception we
shall look at in more detail-they made no use of the Court's power in
their political efforts. In no way did their activities expand, or attempt to
expand, the powers of the judiciary in political affairs. Frankfurter, Mur-
phy tells us, once claimed "that he had a perfect right of citizenship to
lobby on an issue that was 'absolutely unrelated to anything that could be
the concern of the Supreme Court.' 'Certainly,' he continued, 'one does
not cease to be a citizen of the United States, or become unrelated to is-
sues that make for the well being of the world that may never come for
adjudication before this Court, by becoming a member of it.' "212 Frank-
furter was surely correct.
Secondly, in the same way that a Justice is not the judicial branch,
lobbying for legislation is not the same as legislating, and recommending
executive action is not the same as taking it. Thus, even if we accept
Murphy's account at face value, Brandeis and Frankfurter did not im-
pinge on the constitutionally-defined functions of the other branches.
Their actions were, in constitutional terms, no different from a President's
lobbying Congress to pass a bill, or a Senator's recommending a sympa-
thetic crony for a job in an executive agency. Doubly, then, these activities
do not amount to the judicial branch usurping powers of the other two
branches.
A. Partial Agency
To say, moreover, that the Brandeis/Frankfurter activities violated the
separation of powers merely begs the question of how separate the powers
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[Montesquieu] did not mean that these departments ought to have no
partial agency in . . . the acts of each other. His meaning . . . can
amount to no more than this, that where the whole power of one
department is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole
power of another department, the fundamental principles of a free
constitution are subverted.23
This, of course, invites the question of how boundaries should be set
around "partial agency" to ensure the appropriate separation of powers.
The important question in our context is how much "partial agency" a
sitting Supreme Court Justice may assume in other branches. And, in
general terms, the principle must be: only as much partial agency as inter-
feres neither with the other branches' functioning nor with the Justice's
duties.
Working out the particulars of this principle, of course, is much more
difficult than stating it. On the executive-legislative side, we must draw a
line between influence and interference: we must ask how much lobbying
a Justice can do before it shades into covert power-mongering. On the
judicial side, the question concerns the extent to which a Justice can "go
political" without compromising his or her capacity to sit in judgment on
a case before the Court.
Murphy details instances in which he suggests-or at least insinu-
ates-that Brandeis and Frankfurter stepped over both lines in their prac-
tice of "partial agency." According to Murphy, Brandeis once used in-
termediaries to threaten the administration of President Franklin D.
Roosevelt: "'unless he could see some reversal of the big business trend,
he was disposed to hold the government control legislation unconstitu-
tional from now on.' 24 At various times, both Brandeis and Frankfurter
uttered what Murphy takes to be "advisory opinions."25 Murphy argues:
Having an associate justice of the Supreme Court handy with an
advisory opinion, pointing out and helping to rein in any language
that promises to find disfavor with the Court, would surely create a
situation in which those drafting the legislation would be willing to
go right to the edge in the belief that their proposals would with-
stand judicial scrutiny.2
Finally, Murphy raises the general suspicion that Brandeis and Frank-
furter maneuvered restlessly and covertly to "plant" their ideas in the
other branches of government by intellectual influence and by infiltrating
23. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 338 (U. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
24. Pp. 140-41.
25. Pp. 142, 211.
26. P. 218.
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their disciples into the Roosevelt administration.
On the judicial side, Murphy suggests that Brandeis's extrajudicial in-
volvement in the Sacco and Vanzetti defense interfered with the proper
performance of his duties in that case.
Let us briefly examine these incidents.
B. Interference with the Other Branches
Murphy at one point paints a striking portrait of Brandeis and Frank-
furter, "the prophet and the scribe":
A brilliant philosophizing oracle who dreamt a vast master plan for
recreating American society and restructuring its government, Bran-
deis was a visionary prophet. A millionaire twice over when he came
to the Court, he had the time, as well as the inclination, to conceive
his plans. Frankfurter, on the other hand, had long been by necessity
a pragmatist and a bit of a hustler. . . . Too busy doing what was
expedient, solving today's problems today, he could much less than
Brandeis afford to dream grand dreams. His income was limited, in
large measure because his public-service work foreclosed the usual
opportunities. . . . He was at heart a politician. He enjoyed devel-
oping important friendships, currying political favor, and constantly
pressing for any advantage in the arena of political contest.2 7
Frankfurter, according to another recent appraisal, relied heavily on
"his ability to handle the men around him, a process he called per-
sonalia."28 The brilliant, vivacious, and charming Frankfurter tirelessly
maneuvered, sending out countless letters, memoranda, suggestions that
Peter speak with Paul; he flattered and berated; he wheeled and dealed.
Brandeis, on the other hand, moved and shook. According to Murphy,
his basic method of political operation was to hold audiences with govern-
ment officials, squeeze them dry of information, and then let hints of his
views be known. Secretly, he would send detailed ideas to Frankfurter,
who would disseminate them in several ways: through the network of his
students-"Felix's Happy Hot Dogs"-whom he had helped place in
government jobs, through writing, through getting his students to write
about them in the Harvard Law Review, or through "personalia." While
Frankfurter pulled the strings, Brandeis reposed in dignity like the un-
moved mover or, more accurately, the Plotinean One, creating the order of
things by acts of pure emanation.
27. Pp. 250-51.
28. H. HIRSCH, THE ENIGMA OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 12 (1981).
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1. The AAA Case
On one occasion, however, Brandeis let "flash a glimpse of the formida-
ble official powers available to him."29 Brandeis's master plan for the
New Deal was in tension with that of Roosevelt's Brain Trust. Brandeis's
plan had four detailed elements: 1) massive government expenditures on
public-works projects; 2) vast revisions in the federal income tax structure,
to make it a much more progressive system, hitting hard the super-rich
and indeed "eliminating this economic class entirely"; 3) reforming invest-
ment and banking practices; and 4) staffing the government with "lawyers
of ability, training and the right attitude."30 The plan was a child of the
Progressive era: government should break up big business and let the
forces of the free market regulate the fragments.
The Brain Trusters were "collectivists," who "believed in promoting
bigness in the federal government and encouraging monopolistic rather
than competitive businesses. They sought to provide central direction for
the economy." 31 It was this approach that Brandeis told members of the
Administration he "'was disposed to hold . . . unconstitutional from now
on.' "32 According to Murphy, Brandeis issued this threat in April 1934,
specifically to the Brain Trusters' proposed Agricultural Administration
Act (AAA).
The two key questions about this incident are, of course, whether it
happened and whether, if it did, it constituted a serious overstepping of
the invisible line between judicial influence and interference. About the
first, Cover has raised serious questions, based on some ambiguity in
Murphy's sources and the hearsay nature of the evidence.3" Murphy owes
his readers a response to these questions.
About the second, I think no one will disagree that, if Murphy's facts
are correct, this incident was a serious breach on Brandeis's part. To see
exactly why, however, a bit more needs to be said. Suppose that Brandeis
had indeed issued this "threat." Was it real? Murphy, throughout his
argument, tends to blur the distinction between a single Justice and the
entire Supreme Court. Thus, in a discussion of the social security law,
Murphy writes that Brandeis used "fear" as one of his tools for lobbying
the Administration, for "there was always the possibility that Brandeis
might resort to declaring the policy unconstitutional if it was not adopted
29. P. 139.
30. Pp. 104-05.
31. P. 106. For a detailed account of the Brain Trust's philosophy and its conflicts with Brandeis
and his associates, see E. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY (1966).
32. Quoted at p. 141.
33. Cover, supra note 2, at 19-20.
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in accordance with his wishes." '34
But the Social Security Act was signed in August 1935, at a time when
anti-New Deal forces formed a majority in the Court no matter how
Brandeis voted. For this reason, Brandeis had no political leverage of the
sort that Murphy attributes to him. This is not to say that the threat was
not improper; it sits just over the border between influence and interfer-
ence. Nevertheless, since a single Justice holds no absolute constitutional
veto power, political sophisticates such as the men to whom Brandeis was
speaking are hardly likely to change their course for fear of one Justice's
displeasure. Murphy's black-and-white picture is distorted-by, I suspect,
the myopia that comes from too intent a focus on the subjects of his book.
For surely, it distorts both the history of the New Deal and (more gener-
ally) the political toughness of the other branches of government to attri-
bute to a single Justice such dictatorial veto-power. Murphy adduces no
evidence that Brandeis's "threat" changed the AAA legislation; indeed, a
letter from Roosevelt indicates that the President did not take the threat
seriously at all. 35
In April 1934, however, the situation was different. Only two pieces of
Depression legislation had come before the Court. Home Building &
Loan Association v. Blaisdell6 was decided on January 8, 1934, and
Nebbia v. New York3 on March 5, 1934. Both were 5-4 decisions in
favor of the legislation, with Brandeis in the majority. Thus, Brandeis's
threat regarding the AAA was deadly serious, for at that time Court-
watchers in the Administration would have had reason to believe that
Brandeis could single-handedly turn judicial vindication of New Deal
programs into judicial nullification by switching his vote. Until Panama
ReCfining Co. v. Ryan 8 was decided in January 1935, the threat by Bran-
deis would constitute a clear violation of the separation of powers. After it
became obvious that Brandeis no longer held a decisive vote, such a threat,
while still an impropriety, would have been a border-line case. And, it
seems to me, the mere delivery of a Justice's personal views, with no
threat attached, does not violate the separation of powers at all.
It may be objected that an analysis such as this is utterly wrong-headed,
because it rests the distinction between proper and improper extrajudicial
activity on the ability of the executive branch to make nice calculations of
how the Court will vote. That misses the point, however. The real prob-
34. P. 177.
35. Roosevelt promised in the letter to have "a good long talk with [Brandeis] within the next few
days." In fact, Murphy notes, "there is no evidence that the promised conference occurred within the
next month or so." Roosevelt was not quaking. P. 141.
36. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
37. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
38. 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
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lem in extrajudicial activism arises only when a Justice is in a position to
interfere with the actions of the other branches by a threat-tacit or im-
plicit-to foil their plans by exercising his power. A threat, however, is
always relative to its audience. If a Supreme Court Justice says to some-
one utterly ignorant of the legal system: "Watch out, or I'll throw you in
jail," the threat may be real even though the action is in fact impossible.
But it is simply Court-watcher's myopia to think that a Justice's off-the-
bench opinion could deflect the executive branch a jot, except under the
most extraordinary circumstances (such as the situation after Blaisdell and
Nebbia). Every executive action occurs in a maelstrom of political forces
and powerful lobbying, each part of which is assessed in a hard-headed
way. A Justice's informal views do not even rise to the level of a threat, as
Roosevelt's laid-back response to Brandeis's "declaration of war" amply
demonstrates. Thus, the line may be roughly drawn as follows: a Justice's
genuine threat is clearly wrong; a Justice's threat that requires nice calcu-
lation to determine its genuineness is also clearly wrong; a Justice's threat
under normal circumstances is wrong but harmless; and a Justice's ex-
pression of opinion with no threat attached is not wrong at all. One Jus-
tice does not the Supreme Court make.
2. Advisory Opinions
Murphy similarly confuses a single Justice with the whole Court when
he claims that Brandeis and Frankfurter issued "advisory opinions." The
ban on advisory opinions by the Court stems, of course, from the Article
III "cases or controversies" requirement 9 and dates from the Court's re-
fusal in 1793 to advise President Washington. But an individual Justice is
not bound by the cases or controversies requirement.
One of the oddest features of Murphy's book is its appendix, in which
he shows not only that this very distinction was well understood by the
Court,4 but also that there never has been a consistent standard against
personal extrajudicial involvement by the Justices in public affairs: "the
standard was established that, at least in times of crisis, members of the
Court could, and even should, undertake any necessary informal extraju-
dicial tasks that might be useful to the nation."41 Since Murphy also
shows that the Framers never intended to exclude extrajudicial activities
on separation-of-powers grounds, one can only wonder why he writes in
the body of his book as if he were ignorant of the facts in his appendix.
And, regarding his argument that "advisory opinions" by an Associate
39. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 509 (1961) (Brennan, J., concurring); Muskrat v. United




Vol. 91: 1678, 1982
Mr. Fixit
Justice would tempt legislative drafters to the brink, I can only reempha-
size that Washington insiders know that one Justice's opinion does not the
opinion of the Court make.
3. Covert Lobbying
Finally, let us turn to the particular contribution this book makes to
historical scholarship, the revelation of covert lobbying by Brandeis and
Frankfurter (jointly and severally). Murphy leaves little room to doubt
that Brandeis and Frankfurter indeed engaged in "secret political activi-
ties," but his sensationalized and conspiratorial interpretation is not sup-
ported by the evidence he adduces."2 A few examples-the most extreme,
but unfortunately not uncharacteristic-have to serve.
1. According to Murphy, Brandeis would send Frankfurter sugges-
tions for law review articles in order to disseminate his views, and Frank-
furter would farm them out to his students, who would write them for the
Harvard Law Review. Now it is plain that this practice is subject to a
very innocent interpretation: we have an unremarkable chain of intellec-
tual influence. Teachers often suggest topics to students, and it is clear
that the latter are not simply writing copy to the specifications of a profes-
sorial client. Murphy himself claims to recognize this,4 but in fact he
presents it as follows: "Waves of Frankfurter disciples were utilized as
research assistants, and even authors, for producing useful articles.""'
Stravinsky, on this way of thinking, did not write Pulcinella; Diaghilev
did, utilizing him as a composer.
2. Murphy also suggests that Brandeis once abused "the ethics of his
position" by asking Frankfurter for "assistance" on an opinion. It turns
out that the assistance consisted of supplying the title and location of one
of Frankfurter's articles on the commerce clause and some data on the
number of times the Court had reversed itself on commerce clause cases.4 5
3. Brandeis, Murphy tells us, used Frankfurter to "educate"
Roosevelt (then newly elected governor of New York) about his "views."
Murphy's evidence is a letter to Frankfurter asking him to make two re-
42. This is to put the matter calmly, for Murphy's relentless editorializing ranges from an adoles-
cent parenthetical crack, see p. 299, line 15, to some unbelievable innuendo about the Justices' inter-
national loyalties: "Certainly, few men had more impact on the creation of the state of Palestine than
Louis D. Brandeis, a sitting justice of the United States Supreme Court." P. 64. "Clearly, the most
concerned and effective representative of British interests in this country through that period was this
United States Supreme Court justice." P. 282. Those with favorable memories of Frankfurter such as
Isaiah Berlin, Felix Frankfurter at Oxford, in PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 83 (1980), or Max Isenberg,
Reminiscences of Felix Frankfurter as Friend, 51 VA. L. REV. 564 (1965), will find passages such as
these hard to forgive.
43. P. 87.
44. P. 76 (emphasis added).
45. P. 83.
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quests of Roosevelt: "(a) Far reaching attack on 'the Third Degree,' (b)
Good counsel in N.Y.'s cases before our Court." '46 Those were Brandeis's
"views"?
4. Brandeis tried to place sympathetic younger people in the executive
branch, through Frankfurter's connections. Sometimes he had no one spe-
cific in mind. Murphy describes this by saying that he "turned the actual
personnel matters over to his operator in the field, Felix Frankfurter.147
Sometimes Brandeis did make recommendations. And Murphy describes
this as follows: "The justice would not only select a candidate but often
target exactly where that individual was to be placed in the
administration.
4 8
5. Frankfurter also engaged in extrajudicial politicking. He took great
care, however, to keep it separate from his judicial duties. You might
think that this was admirable. But hear Professor Murphy: "Frankfurter
discovered that the solution for compartmentalizing the two sides of his
personality lay in a careful use of two distinct sets of lieutenants ...
[T]he Justice used his law clerks only for judicial matters, and an entirely
different group of proteges for carrying out his political endeavors. ' '1 9
Gasp. (Imagine what Murphy would have written had Frankfurter used
his law clerks for private politicking, and his friends for judicial duties.)
6. Lastly, there are the now famous secret payments from Brandeis to
Frankfurter. Brandeis wrote to Frankfurter in 1916: "My dear Felix:
You have had considerable expense for traveling, telephoning and similar
expenses in public matters undertaken at my request. . . . These expenses
should, of course, be borne by me."5 And again: "I ought to feel free to
make suggestions to you, although they involve some incidental expense.
And you should feel free to incur expense in the public interest."'5
Quite simply, I fail to see what was wrong with this. Murphy says that
Frankfurter was Brandeis's employee,5 '2 but none of the evidence he cites
supports this claim, and the fact that at times Brandeis would plead with
Frankfurter to act on a suggestion when the latter had not5 3 suggests just
the opposite. The evidence suggests a relation of intellectually kindred
spirits, not of principal and agent. And the fact that Brandeis wanted
his-their-ideas out in the political arena, where they could form part of
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appendix suggests,54 it is well within the separation-of-powers conception
of the Framers. Surely Cover is correct: "There is a distinction between
an intellectual community and a political conspiracy. '
In sum: unless one makes the question-begging and historically unwar-
ranted assumption that extrajudicial lobbying by a Justice just is interfer-
ence in other branches of government, Brandeis's and Frankfurter's activi-
ties were not improper under the separation-of-powers concept.
C. Interference with Judicial Work
We must still look at the other separation-of-powers argument, the
claim that such lobbying interferes with the proper functioning of the
Court (rather than, as in the previous argument, the proper functioning of
the other branches). The basic idea is that the more heavily involved Jus-
tices are in extrajudicial activity, the more their judicial activities must be
restricted to avoid conflicts of interest. In particular, if a matter comes
before the Court in which Justices have been active, the Justices may not
be able to sit on the case, and the country is deprived of their abilities.
Murphy suggests that this may have happened in the Sacco-Vanzetti
case. Frankfurter was deeply involved as a publicist in their defense, and
Brandeis was also very interested in the case. But when it came before the
Court, Brandeis disqualified himself because a Mrs. Glendower Evans
had been actively involved in the defense while living in his household.
Murphy believes that the real reason for the recusal was the Brandeis/
Frankfurter connection: "[Brandeis] had put himself into that compromis-
ing position . . . , thereby helping to deprive convicted men of a right to a
fair hearing by the Court's most liberal member."5 If he is right, then
Brandeis's extrajudicial involvement did indeed interfere with his Court
work.
But Murphy's own account suggests otherwise, for in the very next sen-
tence he writes: "Some may wonder . . . whether the Justice would have
felt compelled to step down if the only factor had been his secret contacts
with Frankfurter about the case. His connection with Mrs. Evans ...
could have been the factor that did truly push the Justice to his deci-
sion."'57 So much for Murphy's "depriving convicted men of a right."
Nevertheless, the general problem remains: If a Justice has been extraju-
54. P. 345.
55. Cover, supra note 2, at 21. Cover adds: "Louis Brandeis was not a President's pal, a crony, a
man whose political influence depended upon sycophantic regime identification. He did not buy influ-
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dicially active in a matter that later appears before the Court, will he not
be forced to recuse himself?
Strictly speaking, the answer is no, for except in special circumstances a
Justice alone must decide when to recuse himself.5" But, ethically, can a
Justice sit on a case in which his impartiality has been compromised?
Suppose not. It still does not follow that he should refrain from political
activity, provided that activity does not compromise his impartiality. And
surely it need not. Brandeis, for example, despite his lobbying against the
AAA, voted in favor of its constitutionality.59 Earlier, in 1921, he voted
against portions of a bill "despite his having earlier personally advised
• .. on a strategy for securing initial passage of the measure in the
Senate."6 o
Brandeis, however, was an exceptional person. We may still think that
a Justice cannot count on his own impartiality on matters in which he has
been personally involved-he may not even know whether his judgment
has been affected. And so the general problem remains.
Or does it? The argument presupposes a contrast between the politi-
cally active judge, biased by his own involvement, and an impartial one.
But of course the real contrast is between a judge whose strong political
opinions drive him into political action, and a judge with the same opin-
ions who refrains from action. Surely, the latter is no more impartial than
the former. Should the latter recuse himself as well? That would be ab-
surd, for at least two reasons. First, it is utterly wrong to believe that
Justices could be immune from such opinions-biases, if you will-about
any matter of grave public interest. We would thus be faced with a per-
manently recused Court."'
Second, and more important, we do not want Justices without political
beliefs. Constitutional intrepretation requires a constitutional philosophy,
and that means a political philosophy. Interpretation requires, in addition,
the ability to relate that philosophy to the particulars of fact situations
and legislative language. These two things together imply that a Justice's
hermeneutic equipment must include political opinions both general and
specific. These are prejudices, in the etymological sense of 'pre-judices':
anterior judgments that form the stuff of judicial ability.6 2
58. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); see Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 830-39 (1971)
(memorandum of Rehnquist, J.) (discussing denial of motion to recuse himself).
59. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936); p. 142.
60. P. 54.
61. Even Fred Rodell, who yielded to no one in exposing the biases of the Court, never dreamt
that it could do business in any other fashion. See F. RODELL, NINE MEN 30-31 (1955) (savagely
attacking former railroad lawyers and pro-railroad politicians who formed majority striking down the
Railroad Retirement Act).
62. "Proof that a Justice's mind at the time he joined the Court was a complete tabula rasa in the
area of constitutional adjudication would be evidence of lack of qualification, not lack of bias." Laird
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Murphy's own language reveals this, when he speaks of a "fair hearing
by the Court's most liberal member." This can seem strictly funny, until
we realize that generally we can make sense of the idea that liberal (or
conservative) prejudices are compatible with a fair hearing. I am sug-
gesting that with no prejudices a judge could not decide a case at all.
Intuitions without concepts are blind.
Moreover, we do not expect Justices to keep their political views to
themselves or to recuse themselves if those views foreshadow a case before
the Court. Should Chief Justice Burger recuse himself from cases involv-
ing the rights of the criminal accused, because he has made speeches that
are hostile to those rights? Should Justice Rehnquist, who has written a
thoughtful essay suggesting that some cases with family members do not
belong in court, 3 disqualify himself from hearing arguments about juris-
diction in such a case? Should Justice Marshall, a former litigator for the
NAACP, refuse to hear civil rights cases?
Evidently, we are presented not with a binary choice between impartial
and biased judging but with a continuum ranging over unexpressed belief,
expressed belief, and lobbied-for belief. All are likely to have an effect on
the Justice's decision, and so, insofar as the belief is a principled one that
reflects the Justice's constitutional-political philosophy, and insofar as the
Justice believes that he or she can render impartial judgment, recusal is
neither required nor desirable. Recusal should be reserved for cases in
which a Justice's bias is toward one of the litigants personally. And this
locates the second boundary that the separation of powers draws around
extrajudicial political activity: a Justice's extrajudicial politicking should
not involve him with those who can reasonably be expected to be parties
to future litigation of the matter unless the involvement is so marginal that
no personal identification results. Murphy's evidence does not suggest that
Brandeis's or Frankfurter's activities ever crossed this line.
This admittedly vague principle, together with the earlier injunction
against a Justice's coercive interference with another branch, marks out
an area of political activity consistent with the separation-of-powers prin-
ciple. But a question remains: why not simply proscribe such activity alto-
gether and thereby avoid all risk of overstepping these lines?
The first answer is that the Justices may have something important to
add to political debate. The second answer, however, is more to the heart
of the matter. Perhaps it would be better if, magically, the Supreme Court
v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 835 (1972) (memorandum of Rehnquist, J.); see also Rehnquist, Sense and
Nonsense About Judicial Ethics, 28 REC. A.B. CITY N.Y. 694, 708-13 (1973) (further developing
argument that a Justice should not recuse himself because of previously expressed views on a class of
cases before Court).
63. Rehnquist, The Adversary Society, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (1978).
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could be peopled with judges at once constitutionally wise and politically
innocent. I have questioned whether this would in fact be better, but in
any event it is impossible. The Justices are public men and women, and
the political passions that move them will find expression, if not overtly,
then covertly. It seems clearly better for it to be overt, for otherwise only
obfuscation and hypocrisy can result. If, as I shall now argue, the deep
purpose of the separation of powers is to canalize political passions in a
beneficial way, then it might be said that the separation of powers re-
quires an arena for extrajudicial activism. And, in that case, Justices will
not need to be hypocrites about their extrajudicial activities. Judicial hy-
pocrisy is the measure of failure in fulfilling the purpose of separating the
powers. This brings us to Murphy's second criticism.
III. The Hypocrisy Argument
To many readers, the most troubling aspect of Murphy's revelations is
the hypocrisy of Brandeis and Frankfurter. These are, after all, two great
and admired Justices, and it is unhappy indeed to discover vices in those
we admire. Even those (like myself) who see nothing wrong in a measure
of extrajudicial political activity must confront the fact that publicly both
Justices (and especially Frankfurter) claimed to abhor the very activities
in which they engaged. "Whenever Brandeis was asked to assist in ob-
taining a government appointment, to accept an honorary degree, to write
an article or deliver a speech, he noted on the request 'Judicial Propriety
Precludes,' or simply 'precluded.' "" Frankfurter spoke of the Court as a
"monastery" and himself as a "political eunuch";6 5 he wrote: "I have an
austere and even sacerdotal view of the position of a judge on this Court,
and that means I have nothing to say on matters that come within a thou-
sand miles of what may fairly be called politics."86"
The fact of hypocrisy is important for compiling our calendar of saints
and heroes, for judging Brandeis and Frankfurter as men. But is it impor-
tant for judging them as Justices?
A. Virtue and Vice in the Light of the Separation of Powers
We can approach this question by looking once again at the doctrine of
separation of powers. It is a mistake to analyze this doctrine in narrowly
legal and constitutional terms, for the doctrine is a constitutional solution
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Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the
man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It
may be a reflection on human nature that such devices should be
necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is govern-
ment itself but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? 67
Madison's idea reflects the characteristic eighteenth-century belief that
human passions-particularly the dangerous political passion for
glory-can be controlled only by self-interest. This view is a later out-
growth of a theory that passions may be controlled only by other passions.
In the words of d'Holbach (which should be read side-by-side with The
Federalist Number 51), "[t]he passions are the true counterweights of the
passions; we must not at all attempt to destroy them, but rather try to
direct them: let us offset those that are harmful by those that are useful to
society."6 The later view added that self-interest is the passion most use-
ful to society. It is "the passion of self-love upgraded and contained by
reason,"6 9 so by pitting one interest against another, a form of human
action results that is "exempt from both the destructiveness of passion and
the ineffectuality of reason."' 70 Interest, moreover, is calculable; in Helv&
tius's words, "[a]s the physical world is ruled by the laws of movement so
is the moral universe ruled by laws of interest. 7 1
Madison, then, is claiming that the separation of powers solves (as
much as an institution can) the problem of human vainglory, shackling
passion in bonds of self-interest and then curbing interests by pitting them
one against another. The doctrine is a reflection on man's avaricious na-
ture, finding in human greed the solution to unadorned will to power. It is
a Bad Man theory of government. 2
It does not, however, address the problem of the Good Man. In Bran-
deis and Frankfurter, the passions were unrestrainable by self-interest, for
Brandeis had more money than he wanted and Frankfurter did not want
money. Nor did they crave power in the obvious sense: they did not desire
to rule. Their real passion, however, was potentially just as dangerous-it
was the desire to manipulate history itself, the urge to play demiurge.
"History," Frankfurter wrote in 1957, "is the interplay of. .. anony-
mous propelling forces and of individuals, so that a few individuals may
make the difference in the import and incidence, the triumph and deflec-
67. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 322 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
68. P. D'HOLBACH, SYSTkME DE LA NATURE 424-25 (G. Olms trans. 1966) (1st ed. London
1770), quoted in A. HIRSCHMAN, THE PASSIONS AND THE INTERESTS: POLITICAL ARGUMENTS FOR
CAPITALISM BEFORE ITS TRIUMPH 27 (1977).
69. A. Hirschman, supra note 68, at 43.
70. Id. at 43-44.
71. 1 C. HELVTIUS, DE L'ESPRIT (Paris 1758), quoted in A. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 68, at 43.
72. See Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459-62 (1897).
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tion, of these anonymous forces."'73 This is consistent with his opinion that
judges must "pierce the curtain of the future. . . give shape and visage to
mysteries still in the womb of time."'7 4 We can recognize in this the nine-
teenth-century view (of dismal memory) that historical progress is a
quasi-natural process to be harnessed by farsighted men.
Obviously, Brandeis and Frankfurter had neither the messianic delu-
sions nor the political power of the European apostles of history. They
preferred to coach history from the sidelines. Even that ambition, how-
ever, can be dangerous. Madison believed that the chains of self-interest
are the chains of common sense. Once they are broken, only one thing can
save the soul of a man with Felix Frankfurter's profound self-confidence,
and that is his own self-control, his human virtue. 5 Grant that a Justice's
power is limited; it is nevertheless great in its own sphere, and for that
reason the question of personal virtue is a politically significant one.
When interest can no longer be counted on, virtue must take over; other-
wise private vices assume public significance.
B. The Vice of Hypocrisy
Some vices, of course, are unlikely to affect a Justice's duties: a Justice's
mistreatment of his wife makes him a worse man but not a worse Justice.
Gross appetites, pomposity, and physical cowardice are vices of the per-
son, not of the judge. Moral cowardice, however, and mean-spiritedness,
and bigotry, and anger, are vices of the judge, for they are all components
of judgment. What, then, about hypocrisy?
I believe that hypocrisy is a vice of the judge and not merely of the
human being. Judges, and preeminently Justices of the Supreme Court,
interpret and articulate the standards that govern our conduct. Hypocrites,
however, profess (and profess to abide by) standards that they do not in
fact observe. A judge's hypocrisy thereby calls into question his own un-
derstanding of the role of standards in human affairs.
To see this more clearly, it is useful to contrast hypocrisy with another
way in which conduct can diverge from professed standards. No one
abides by traffic laws all the time; driving would be less safe and efficient
if everyone did abide by them. Because they understand this, police do not
rigorously enforce the laws. It is not, moreover, hypocrisy for a person to
support the control of traffic while at the same time running an occasional
73. P. 200.
74. F. FRANKFURTER, The Judicial Process and the Supreme Court, in OF LAW AND MEN 39
(1956).
75. Learned Hand wrote: "'well of course [Frankfurter has] got a very passionate nature, and
that is rather an initial handicap for a judge . . . [though] not if he has the faculty of adding to it
supreme self-restraint. He's learned a good deal of it. But he hasn't it.'" Quoted at p. 251.
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red light. All this shows is that a regime of laws must leave life livable,
and an inflexible regime cannot. Standards must bend to sanity.
In such instances a judge may profess the standard while recognizing
that it requires some free play. Portia, in The Merchant of Venice, calls
the trait of character that enables us to act in this way "mercy" and con-
trasts it with the strict, rulebound legalism that Shylock calls "justice.""6
The word "mercy" is a bit misleading, because it carries connotations of
supererogation (rather like "forgiveness"), whereas mercy in the sense I
am describing is part of legal justice, while rulebound legalism is not. I
will nevertheless stay with the the term "mercy." My point is then that
for a judge to profess a standard while applying it mercifully is not the
same as hypocrisy. Indeed, I believe that it is the opposite of hypocrisy.
Let us see why.
Obviously, the letter of the law cannot specify when enforcing the letter
of the law is not good sense." That judgment must be left to judicial
discretion, and what I am calling "mercy" is really the common sense that
must underwrite judicial discretion. The hypocritical judge, however,
lacks just this virtue. For his secret violation of a standard is comple-
mented by public espousal of it: he holds up the standard as inviolate,
and, by claiming personally to follow it unswervingly, in effect rejects the
proposition that the law must accommodate particular cases. Rochefou-
cauld said that hypocrisy is the homage that vice pays to virtue.78 To the
extent that is so, hypocrisy is a useful flaw. But Rochefoucauld should
have added that hypocrisy cannot pay virtue's homage to vice, namely
mercy. By its nature, hypocrisy pretends to pure compliance, and thus
demands it of others. Where mercy reconciles ideal standards with the
human world, hypocrisy opens a moral distance between them-and that
is why it is a defect of character, above all in a judge.
A hypocritical judge, moreover, divides the world into those who are
bound by articulated standards and those-principally himself-who are
not. In two ways, then, the hypocritical judge threatens the uniformity of
law: by denying the divergence between standards and behavior at the
same time that he lives it himself, he introduces a gap between meaning
and use into his own pronouncements; at the same time he sets himself
apart from the rest of us as a one-person elite who is beyond his own law.
Since he will not bend standards to common sense, but only to his own
76. Compare W. SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act IV, scene i, lines 184-205 (Por-
tia's speech in court of justice scene); with act III, scene iii, lines 4-10 (Shylock's speech prior to court
of justice scene). The importance of this contrast in The Merchant of Venice was pointed out to me in
a paper by my student Mykel Hitselberger.
77. This problem is discussed extensively in M. KADISH & S. KADISH, DISCRETION TO DISOBEY:
A STUDY OF LAWFUL DEPARTURES FROM LEGAL RULES 37-65 (1973).
78. F. DUC DE LA ROCHEFOUCAULD, MAXIMES, No. 218, at 86 (F. Green ed. 1946) (Paris 1665).
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will, the hypocrite creates a moral discontinuity between his judgments
and his actions; both become suspect. It is this discontinuity, and not "ju-
dicial impropriety," that is troubling in Frankfurter and Brandeis.
I do not wish to overstate the conclusion of these reflections. Obviously,
Brandeis and Frankfurter were not immoderate or inflexible in their judi-
cial opinions; as Philip Kurland rightly says, "Frankfurter was never able
to accommodate to the notion of the Constitution's grand clauses as fixed
and unbending formulas that meant the same thing regardless of the cir-
cumstances that called forth their application." 9 The argument that hy-
pocrisy is unable to pay virtue's homage to vice may hold only of the
particular standard that is being maintained hypocritically. A person can
be hypocritical about some matters and not others. Thus, it is principally
in his judgments about "politically active" brethren that we find a curious
and injudicious brittleness in Frankfurter. Yet this is a flaw not uncon-
nected with jurisprudential issues.
C. Hypocrisy and Technocratic Elitism
When we are confronted by hypocrisy as blatant as Brandeis's and
Frankfurter's, it is natural to seek an explanation, a way of reading their
judgments and actions that will remove the discrepancy between them. H.
N. Hirsch is helpful here. He argues that Brandeis and Frankfurter both
believed "that the executive and legislative should be given wide latitude
in the formulation of social and economic policy," a view that in turn
derives from a belief "in the efficacy of scientific expertise and the need
for experts in government."8 This view, which underlies their urging of
judicial self-restraint, can also explain their political activism, their at-
tempts to ensure that expert opinion such as their own and that of their
intellectual fellow-travelers would indeed inform the decisions of the other
branches. Add to this the Caesar's wife argument, according to which ju-
dicial self-restraint becomes credible only if judges are believed to be polit-
ically quiescent, and you get an explanation of their hypocrisy.
But, if this argument is sound, then judicial self-restraint, extrajudicial
activism, and hypocritical disclaimers all derive from an elitist and techno-
cratic view of the executive and legislative functions. For that reason, even
though judicial self-restraint and extrajudicial self-restraint are quite dis-
tinct, the Justices' hypocrisy about the latter calls into question their justi-
fication for the former.
I am not, I hasten to add, supporting Murphy's fantastic hypothesis
79. P. KURLAND, MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER AND THE CONSTITUTION 75 (1971).
80. H. HIRSCH, supra note 28, at 129-30. For an example of this, see Brandeis's famous dissent
in New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 284-85, 304-11 (1931) (states have right to experi-
ment with new policies in scientific spirit).
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that judicial self-restraint was merely a tactic to cover up the Justices'
political activities."1 Rather, my point is that their views about judicial
activism on the bench are part and parcel of the rigidity induced by their
hypocrisy concerning their own off-the-bench activism, and both derive
from the same dubious and elitist theory of government. The elitism of
hypocrisy, its espousal of standards that bind everyone but the hypocrite,
flows naturally from the hypocrisy of elitism, the disclaimers by which the
machinations of the experts are hidden for the public's own good. Judicial
self-restraint is supposed to prevent appointed judges from interfering
with elected officials. If, however, judicial self-restraint is complemented
by expert sovereignty rather than democratic process, its most compelling
justification disappears. For even Supreme Court Justices are more ac-
countable than consultants and self-styled policy scientists.
IV. The Caesar's Wife Argument
It is an old refrain that an overly active Supreme Court might "gener-
ate such widespread political reaction that the Court would be destroyed
in its wake."8" As Frankfurter wrote in Baker v. Carr, "The Court's au-
thority-possessed of neither the purse nor the sword-ultimately rests on
sustained public confidence in its moral sanction. Such feeling must be
nourished by the Court's complete detachment, in fact and in appearance,
from political entanglements .... "8 Murphy's Caesar's wife argument
is a variant of this refrain. The individual Justices, no less than the Court
itself, must be publicly perceived as beyond politics, beyond having consid-
ered engaging in politics, a thousand miles beyond what may fairly be
called politics. Otherwise, the public will lose confidence in the impartial-
ity of Court decisions, and the authority of the Court will collapse, creat-
ing great potential for violence and anarchy.
At first glance this argument looks spurious and even offensive. By in-
structing the Justices to look better than they really are, the argument
seems to license deception. The public must be made to believe like chil-
dren that the Court's opinions are brought by the stork. The obvious reply
is, why should we have more confidence in the Court's detachment than
the Court deserves? Or, put the other way around, why not permit us to
maintain our confidence in the Court in full knowledge of what the Court
is really like? Instead, the Caesar's wife argument seems to mandate hy-
pocrisy in the name of the public good.
81. Pp. 268-69.
82. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and the When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1366
(1973).
83. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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A. Instrumental Propriety
Of course, Professor Murphy does not claim to be recommending hy-
pocrisy. As I mentioned, he turns the Caesar's wife argument on its head
and makes it a criticism of Brandeis and Frankfurter: since the appear-
ance of propriety is of the utmost importance, and the only way to main-
tain this appearance (in the age of Woodward and Armstrong) is really to
be proper, apolitical behavior is necessary-not because politicking is bad,
but because being seen to politick is. I do not find this argument
persuasive.
In the first place, it is topsy-turvy. Ordinarily, we object to the appear-
ance of impropriety because it suggests the existence of real impropriety.
Now, however, political behavior is improper only because of how it
looks. This creates an odd circularity. Political behavior is improper be-
cause avoiding it is essential to maintaining the appearance of propriety,
which includes the appearance of apoliticality, because political behavior
is improper. Surely one needs independent reasons for thinking that polit-
ical behavior is improper; how else can the argument get off the ground?
Secondly, Murphy's idea that judges must not engage in covert behavior
because they will get caught is scarcely a reason to condemn the behavior.
It amounts to saying that the only thing wrong with covert politicking is
that it cannot be covert enough.
Murphy's variation on the Caesar's wife argument, which recommends
"ethics" only as the simplest way of keeping up appearances, should be
rejected. The argument becomes powerful only in its pure form as a
straightforward recommendation of judicial hypocrisy. For clearly, it was
on the basis of considerations such as maintaining public confidence in the
Court that Brandeis and Frankfurter chose to act politically under the
mask of hypocrisy. They must, one supposes, have accepted the Caesar's
wife argument, for why else would they have chosen the path of
hypocrisy?
B. Shklar's Defense of Hypocrisy
In a recent and characteristically thoughtful essay, the well-known po-
litical theorist Judith Shklar has pointed out an intimate connection be-
tween hypocrisy and democratic politics and in effect has endorsed hypoc-
risy. 4 Her defense is the best I know for the Caesar's wife argument; I
trust, then, that it will not take us too far afield to consider its merits. I do
not believe that her defense will stand up; seeing why it will not, however,
helps pinpoint the real source of disquiet with the Brandeis/Frankfurter
84. Shklar, Let Us Not Be Hypocritical, 108 DAEDALUS 1 (1979).
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activities.
Shklar uses four arguments. The first is an attack on anti-hypoc-
risy-the urge to unmask-as a political principle; it is not germane to
our present inquiry, and I shall not pursue it. The second is a claim that
political persuasion, and hence the attainment of democratic consensus,
requires hypocrisy. The third is a variant of Rochefoucauld's thought that
hypocrisy is vice's homage to virtue: hypocrisy makes the public world
better, more civil, and more endurable than would a frankness that poi-
sons the air with private vice. And the fourth is a version of the Caesar's
wife argument itself. Let us examine the last three arguments.
1. Shklar discusses the connection between hypocrisy and persuasion
by reflecting on the character of Benjamin Franklin:
He was a shrewd calculator who took it for granted that the politics
of persuasion required hypocrisy. The only alternative, as he well
knew, was force. . . . That a public man should try to make him-
self acceptable to his fellow-citizens did not strike Franklin as despi-
cable; on the contrary, he carefully taught himself to hide much of
his native character. . . .Here is hypocrisy as a conscious act in
response to a situation that demands it. Persuasion is not natural; it
requires a great deal of effort, and in a man as superior to his fel-
lows as Franklin was, it takes exactly what he described. It was a
mark of Franklin's greatness that he always knew what was called
for and could do what he thought right . . . . A democratic "social
fabric" would "come undone" just as quickly as any other if every-
one were always "wholly frank with everyone.
' 85
No public program wins by sheer merit alone: a good idea's time has
come only when it is linked with persuasion. That is, after all, what poli-
tics is all about.88 If, therefore, a man of Franklin's "superiority" is to
press his political program in democratic councils, he must do what he
must to make himself palatable. Unmasked politicians can hope for noth-
ing better than acrimonious defeat. Nor is this principle sheer manipula-
tiveness, for Franklin was seeking to establish a genuine democratic will,
not to ram his ideas down unwilling throats.
Shklar's Franklin must surely remind us of Brandeis and Frankfurter,
two men of the highest ability, with strong ideas about the needs of the
republic, who proceeded masked only so that their ideas could obtain, in
Franklin's words, influence in public councils without arousing resent-
ment based on their source. As a consequence of this wise hypocrisy,
sound policies and good government appointments were made. What bet-
85. Id. at 16-17.
86. See Luban, On Habermas on Arendt on Power, 6 PHIL. & SOC. CRITICISM 79, 86-88 (1979).
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ter justification could be offered?
At one point, Shklar writes, "Franklin was, by any standards, a great
man. He always knew that about himself."8 Similarly, Brandeis and
Frankfurter were great men and knew that about themselves. Unfortu-
nately, however, many who think they are great are not. Should they, too,
utilize deception and hypocrisy to realize their foolish policies in practice?
Being a great persuader (shall we say "a Great Communicator"?) does
not always go hand in hand with having good ideas. Not every influential
hypocrite is a Franklin. Shklar's argument depends for its force on the
example she chooses, on the fact that Franklin not only "knew" that he
was great, but was great. The fallacy of her argument is that it relies
exclusively on the wisdom of hindsight, which is by definition unavailable
at the moment a Franklin lures his fellows into following his ideas. Seen
after the fact, we can all discover that a policy was great, and its propo-
nent foresighted. Before the fact, no one can know that, including the pro-
ponent. Shklar mistakes practical wisdom for prophecy.
Hypocrisy recommends itself to those who know they are great, those
who-like Franklin, Brandeis and Frankfurter but also like their epi-
gones-want to rest their hand on the throttle of history. Many of us,
however, have no trust in prophets, and believe neither that history exists
to second their motions, nor that the wisdom of foresight is identical with
prediction-that it is, in other words, merely the wisdom of hindsight mi-
nus a few years. We will find Franklin's "spirit of cool calculation with-
out any claim to humility"88 less appealing.
What, then, do we say to those who, like Franklin, Brandeis, and
Frankfurter, know that their opinions are right? Shall we tell them not to
act as they must? Perhaps not; they will not listen in any event. We can
tell them only that they are acting as a self-proposed elite, and that, no
matter what the verdict of history, we shall admire their genius but not
their hypocrisy.
2. Shklar's next argument may be dealt with briefly. It is that public
hypocrisy, the pretense of virtue, is more civilized than candid vice:
It is, for example, no longer acceptable to make racist and anti-Se-
mitic remarks in public in America; yet in private conversation, ra-
cism and anti-Semitism are expressed as freely and as frequently as
ever. Many a Southerner used to sneer at this display of hypocrisy.
Now even he, like many a Northerner, is down to a few code words
at election time. Would any egalitarian prefer more frankness?
Should our public conduct really mirror our private, inner selves?
87. Shklar, supra note 84, at 16.
88. Id.
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Often our public manners are better than our personal laxities.8 '
Once again, however, Shklar's example is persuasive for the wrong rea-
son. The reason we prefer not to hear a racist sentiment publicly ex-
pressed is that its expression is itself a racist act and hence morally wrong.
Shklar's example is unique and not transferable to other varieties of hy-
pocrisy, because candid racist remarks are "performative" utterances: a
revelation of racism is an act of racism. That fact, rather than our prefer-
ring not to know that public officials are racists, is the justification of
hypocrisy.
In particular, the argument does not apply to the Brandeis/Frankfurter
activities. For, unlike racism, these are not evil on independently specifia-
ble grounds. Indeed, had Brandeis and Frankfurter come out of the closet
with their political activity, a step might have been taken toward public
recognition that judicial politicking is not really a vice after all.
3. Finally, Shklar offers the Caesar's wife argument itself, in a form
generalized so that it includes not merely the Supreme Court, but all the
institutions of American government:
[R]epresentative democracy must, like any form of government,
maintain its legitimacy by reinforcing the ideological values upon
which it is based. Not only must these be invoked on all possible
occasions, but they must serve as the justification for specific policies
... .No one can hope to govern without reference to these values.
It is neither psychologically feasible nor politically possible to evade
them when every utterance is sure to receive close public scrutiny.
That means that those engaged in governing must assume at the very
least two roles, one of pursuing policies and another of edifying the
governed in order to legitimize these plans. . . . There is neverthe-
less a built-in tension; for the disparity between what is said and
what is done remains great. . . .No one lives up to a collective
ideal.. . . Without ancestor worship or divine providence to rely on,
modern liberal democracy has little but its moral promise to sustain
it. That is why it generates both political exigency and the interplay
of hypocrisy and vocal antihypocrisy.90
To take the example at hand: the Court's legitimating ideological ideal is
to dispense justice-impartial justice untainted by political favoritism. If
the public did not believe in this ideological ideal, the Court (so the argu-
ment goes) would lose its legitimacy and authority. Now in point of fact,
as has been demonstrated by the Court-watchers from Fred Rodell to
89. Id. at 19.
90. Id. at 13-14.
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Woodward and Armstrong and Professor Murphy, the Court's dynamics
are highly political. The Court must nevertheless reinforce the ideological
values upon which its authority rests, and that means among other things
the exaggerated posture of insulation from politics. This, then, is the Cae-
sar's wife argument, deriving exigent hypocrisy as a consequence of the
fragile nature of democratic legitimacy.
The key to this argument, I believe, is that it tacitly but unequivocally
divides the nation into two sorts of people, which I shall call the Ins and
the Outs. The Outs are the anonymous millions for whom the Court's
legitimacy and authority rests on the myth that the Justices are apolitical.
The Ins are those of us-Professors Shklar and Murphy, the legally and
politically sophisticated, the hard-headed Court-watchers-who know that
the apolitical Court is a myth and who realize that its democratic legiti-
macy comes from elsewhere. The virtue and depth of Shklar's analysis is
that it explains where the Court's legitimacy comes from: the fact that we
respect and adhere to it as an institution-"we" in this case meaning Ins
and Outs together. The Outs, however, respect it for the wrong reason,
and the Ins respect it because it is legitimate, that is, because it has the
loyalty of the Outs. The justification of hypocrisy by the Caesar's wife
argument is simply the view that hypocrisy is required to preserve the
Outs' respect of the Court.
The Caesar's wife argument, and Shklar's generalization of it, are in-
tended for the Ins. One cannot believe with the Outs that the Court is
apolitical and simultaneously believe with Shklar that it only pretends to
be apolitical to reinforce a norm. If an Out became convinced of Shklar's
theory, he would either change into an In by virtue of believing the theory
or else lose faith in the Court. And not every Out can become an In, for
then the entire nation would believe that the Court's legitimacy derives
from an appearance of detachment which in fact appears to no one.""
It follows that, if institutions are to maintain their legitimacy, not ev-
eryone can believe Shklar's theory. Some Outs must be left out. And so,
the theory divides the nation into Ins and Outs, normatively as well as
descriptively: not only are there two sorts of people, but it is better that
way.
The outcome of these dialectical twists and turns is that the Caesar's
wife argument suffers from the same fatal elitism of utilitarianism that
Bernard Williams was the first to criticize. 2 Utilitarians confront the fact
91. It is not logically impossible, however, for there to be a nation of Ins who do not know that
they are all Ins, and who therefore believe that hypocritical institutions are legitimate because they
think that there are Outs out there to be fooled.
92. Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism, in J. SMART & B. WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR
AND AGAINST 138-40 (1973).
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that it will be better if most people are not utilitarians. We are more
likely to do the utilitarian best thing if we do not act out of belief in
utilitarianism but rather out of a nonutilitarian sense of loyalty or duty."
Or people may simply be happier if they have nonutilitarian projects to
pursue.
For this reason, the utilitarian must cultivate a world of Ins and
Outs-the select few social planners who keep the utilitarian faith, and
the vast majority of subjects who are better off on utilitarian grounds not
even knowing that utilitarianism exists." In the same way, the Caesar's
wife argument advocates hypocrisy so that policymakers can make policy
as they think it should be made while maintaining public confidence that
they are doing something else. The Ins know the value of keeping up
appearances. And the Outs must be fooled for their own good.
V. Judicial Ethics or Technocratic Reformism?
It is not surprising that the political activities of Brandeis and Frank-
furter should share some of the vices (and the virtues as well) of utilitari-
anism. For the Justices, like the utilitarians, were social reformers who
believed that moral progress could be made through enlightened problem-
solvers who govern through scientific expertise.9 5 The assumptions in-
93. A special case of this utilitarian argument is set out and criticized by Michael Walzer, Politi-
cal Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 160, 171-74 (1973).
94. Williams has remarked in discussions that this was the actual situation of British colonial
administrators in India. Many of them were utilitarians, but rather than trying to "convert" the
Indians, they decided that their utilitarian projects would better be realized if the Indians remained
Hindus.
It may be thought that this argument caricatures the utilitarian position, but the division into Ins
and Outs comes directly out of Sidgwick:
Thus, on Utilitarian principles, it may be right to do and privately recommend, under certain
circumstances, what it would not be right to advocate openly; it may be right to teach openly to
one set of persons what it would be wrong to teach to others; it may be conceivably right to do,
if it can be done with comparative secrecy, what it would be wrong to do in the face of the
world. . . . These conclusions are all of a paradoxical character. there is no doubt that the
moral consciousness of a plain man broadly repudiates the general notion of an esoteric moral-
ity, differing from that popularly taught; and it would be commonly agreed that an action
which would be bad if done openly is not rendered good by secrecy. We may observe, however,
that there are strong utilitarian reasons for maintaining generally this latter common opinion.
Thus the Utilitarian conclusion, carefully stated, would seem to be this; that the opinion
that secrecy may render an action right which would not otherwise be so should itself be kept
comparatively secret; and similarly it seems expedient that the doctrine that esoteric morality is
expedient should itself be kept esoteric. Or if this concealment be difficult to maintain, it may
be desirable that Common Sense should repudiate the doctrines which it is expedient to confine
to an enlightened few. And thus, a Utilitarian may reasonably desire, on Utilitarian principles,
that some of his conclusions should be rejected by mankind generally; or even that the vulgar
should keep aloof from his system as a whole....
H. SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS 489-90 (7th ed. 1907). Sidgwick apparently did not believe
that the dosed and stratified society this argument contemplates is objectionable; the fact that we think
so may have something to do with being vulgar.
95. See p. 21 (describing Brandeis as "problem-solver"). For a discussion of the Justices' belief in
the power of scientific reason over judicial superstition, see A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND
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volved in this position are three: that history is the unfolding of processes
through "homogeneous, empty time"96 so that gradual historical progress
is achievable,9" that good government is a kind of techn6 in which experts
utilize their knowledge and foresight to solve public problems in such a
way that the results can be objectively confirmed by the "verdict of his-
tory,"98s and that the populist goals so central to American political life
can be achieved by talented and well-meaning administrators acting from
above. These three assumptions-the belief in progress, in expertise, and
in benevolent paternalism-are the components of American liberalism,
virtually unchanged from the Progressive era, through the New Deal, to
the present." I shall call this view technocratic reformism. It is, I believe,
the view of Brandeis and Frankfurter.
Frankfurter, Murphy tells us, was first drawn to Brandeis when, in
1905, Frankfurter heard him address the Harvard Ethical Society on The
Opportunity in the Law: "Brandeis told the next generation of elite law-
yers to consider the advantages of working for the people, rather than for
rich corporations. Only by struggling against economic irregularities, he
said, could their legal training be used to lessen the prospect of class war-
fare."1 00 The reference to class war is a bit startling to contemporary ears
but was something of a commonplace in the early years of the century. It
helps place the origins of the Justices' technocratic reformism in the belief
that capitalism could be saved only if the elite worked to give it a human
face. Technocratic reformism was born in a rejection of socialism on the
left and Social Darwinism-"Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics"-on
the right.10' Both Social Darwinism and the mechanistic socialism of the
era shared the same nineteenth century premise that human affairs are
governed by quasi-natural historic forces, generating progress by invisible
hand mechanisms. Technocratic reformers also believe in progress but not
in invisible hands. Frankfurter wrote: "There is no inevitability in history
THE IDEAL OF PROGRESS 14-40 (1970); P. KURLAND, supra note 79, at 1.
96. W. BENJAMIN, Theses on the Philosophy of History, ILLUMINATIONS 261 (1969) (Thesis
XIV).
97. For a deep criticism of the concept of progress in history, see H. ARENDT, THE LIFE OF THE
MIND: WILLING 152-59 (1978); W. BENJAMIN, supra note 96, at 261.
98. This I described above as the view that the wisdom of foresight is simply the wisdom of
hindsight minus a few years. For a criticism of this view of government, see H. ARENDT, THE
HUMAN CONDITION 220-30 (1958); J. HABERMAS, The Classical Doctrine of Politics in Relation to
Social Philosophy, in THEORY AND PRACTICE 41 (1973).
99. This set of views, it should be noted, has very little to do with classical liberalism as a political
theory. The New Dealers wanted a label for their program. They rejected "progressivism" because it
suggested a return to outmoded policies, and "socialism" because of its un-American connotations.
Finally, they settled on "liberalism" to rob their conservative opponents of one of their own rhetorical
identifications-and it has been "liberalism" ever since. See Rotunda, The "Liberal" Label:
Roosevelt's Capture of a Symbol, 17 PUB. POL'Y 377 (1968).
100. P. 35.
101. A. BICKEL, supra note 95, at 15-16.
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except as men make it,"1 2 and this modification of the progressivist as-
sumption lies at the root of his and Brandeis's belief in expertise. °3
This is surely not the place to explore the defects of the beliefs in pro-
gress and expertise, which have in any event been lambasted by social
theorists since the 1930's. For the problems we have been considering
arise from the third assumption, that populist goals may be achieved by
proxy-by the best and the brightest working from above. The problem is
that this assumption is drastically at odds with the democratic temper of
American politics (I am tempted to say, of any legitimate politics). The
benevolent paternalist can solve this problem only by operating behind the
scenes, by hypocritically invoking democratic ideals on all occasions (as
Shklar tells the story), by lobbying the elite of Ins on behalf of the Outs
who must not know what is happening.0 4
Professor Murphy worries about Supreme Court improprieties in the
post-Watergate era.10 5 Via Watergate, the Nixon administration has come
to symbolize covert "unethical" actions by those in high office-actions
that usurp other governmental powers and violate public trust.' °0 Nixon
has led us to mistrust the personal ethics of high public officials.
If my argument is sound, the real problem with the political activities
of Brandeis and Frankfurter is not that they violated "judicial ethics." It
is rather that their elitist behavior, with its inevitable hypocrisies, is asso-
ciated with technocratic reformism. And, if Watergate symbolizes our loss
of trust in the ethics of public officials, two other events mark the end of
our seventy-year-old faith in technocratic reform.
The first, of course, is the Vietnam War, in which-particularly after
the publication of the Pentagon Papers-it became manifest that the best
and the brightest could not be counted on for either common sense or
elementary morality. Indeed, since the Pentagon Papers themselves re-
vealed that the experts were deliberating not about questions of policy, but
about "image-making" and hoodwinking the public, the Papers amount to
102. Quoted in P. KURLAND, supra note 79, at 1.
103. Recall the previously cited letter Frankfurter wrote about history's "anonymous propelling
forces" and the "few individuals [who] may make the difference." Supra pp. 1693-94.
104. P. KURLAND, supra note 79, at 1 ("When 'elite' became a word of opprobrium, we entered a
world totally foreign to Frankfurther's ethos."). The problem is that the word "elite" has always been
a word of opprobrium in America. Brandeis's ethos, as well, directed him to solve problems as he saw
fit without much concern for the levelling niceties of received opinion-this, indeed, was the gravamen
of the charges surrounding his private practice as "lawyer for the situation," which contributed in
part to his difficulties in being confirmed to the Supreme Bench. See Frank, The Legal Ethics of
Louis D. Brandeis, 17 STAN. L. REV. 683 (1965).
105. Pp. 13-15, 344.
106. For a discussion of Nixon's violations of the separation of powers, see Quint, The Separation
of Powers Under Nixon: Reflections on Constitutional Liberties and the Rule of Law, 1981 DUKE
L.J. I.
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a reductio ad absurdum of technocratic hyprocrisy.107
The second event was the beginning of the Black Power movement,
which brought with it the expulsion of well-educated, well-meaning
whites from the forefront of civil rights activities. Nothing symbolized
more strikingly that reform could no longer flow unproblematically from
above, that benevolent paternalism was now off the agenda. This event, of
course, was felt immediately only on the American left, which drew from
it conclusions about the inadequacy of liberalism."' Its repercussions
were wider, however, for it spelled the beginning of the end for the old
New Deal coalition whose support had made technocratic reformism pos-
sible.'09 To the extent that the old liberal agenda was a humane one-and
it would wrong Brandeis and Frankfurter to suggest that their vision was
not humane-its wreck is to be regretted. To the extent that the agenda
dried up democracy-from-below and treated the old coalition as the Brit-
ish administrators treated their Hindus, it is not.
Former Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, Professor Murphy
tells us, once referred to Frankfurter as "Mr. Fixer." 10 That, in a word,
is the substance of Murphy's criticism of both Frankfurter and Brandeis.
If my argument is correct, the real criticism is not of their ethics, but of
their boundless faith in expertise to solve the public's problems. It is not a
criticism of Mr. Fixer, but of the all-purpose technological wizard-Mr.
Fixit.
Conclusion: Mr. Fixit and Mr. Clean
That brings us to the present. No consideration of The Brandeis/
Frankfurter Connection would be complete without taking note of the fact
that its publication was itself a political event.
The federal judiciary is currently undergoing one of the most severe
attacks in its history, as the Right, whose resurgence followed upon the
breakup of the old New Deal coalition, seeks to strip the judiciary of the
ability to erect roadblocks to its program. The key villians identified by
this attack are "activist" judges. The substance of the charge is, politically
speaking, beside the point, because in essence it is a complaint about fed-
eral judges using their power to enact a liberal agenda.
In this climate, Professor Murphy's book fuels the belief that liberals
who attain the Federal bench simply cannot keep their hands off. It does
107. See H. ARENDT, Lying in Politics: Reflections on the Pentagon Papers, in CRISES OF THE
REPUBLIC 3 (1972).
108. See K. SALE, SDS 276-77 (1973).
109. See Lasch, Liberalism in Retreat, in LIBERALISM RECONSIDERED (D. MacLean & C. Mills
eds. forthcoming); Skocpol, The Legacies of New Deal Liberalism, in id.
110. P. 291.
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not matter that the Brandeis/Frankfurter activities were extrajudicial, nor
that both Justices were proponents of judicial self-restraint. The New
York Times editorial begins: "These are difficult days for those who like
their heroes liberal, wise and ethical.""' Echoing the Caesar's wife argu-
ment, the Times continues, "[o]ur courts need all the moral authority they
can muster to ward off today's Congressional attacks.""' 2 Not Mr. Fixit,
but Mr. Clean, is needed.
There is no evidence in his book that Professor Murphy objects to the
substance of Brandeis's and Frankfurter's political agenda, and it is thus
not a little ironic that his scholarship has aroused interest primarily be-
cause of its resonance with their adversaries' suspicions. Yet it is primarily
Murphy's discussion of events in terms of an "ethics" for which no real
justification is provided that allows this use of his findings. I have sug-
gested that nothing in principle is wrong with Supreme Court Justices
laying their political principles on the table and arguing for them, out in
the open, in the chambers of government. For the opposite of an overt
political agenda is not no agenda but rather a hidden one obvious only to
astute Court-watchers and other Ins. A politically expressive judge, of
course, is no Mr. Clean, but without the veil of hypocrisy, Mr. Fixit dis-
appears as well. We are, I suspect, well quit of both.
111. Judging Judges, and History, supra note 2. The rest of the editorial speaks almost entirely
of Brandeis; presumably, the fact that Frankfurter is not remembered as a "liberal" Justice would
interfere with the heroic simplicity of the editorial analysis.
112. Id.
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Off the Bench and Into the Mire:
Judging Extrajudicial Behavior
The Brandeis/Frankfurter Connection. By Bruce Allen Murphy.
New York: Oxford University Press, 1982. Pp. x, 473. $18.95.
Harlon L. Daltont
Bruce Allen Murphy's book about the relationship between Louis D.
Brandeis and Felix Frankfurter and about their secret political activities
bears roughly the same relationship to penetrating legal biography as does
a coloring book to a pointillistic painting. Coloring book "art" is created
by connecting dots to form an image and filling in that image with color.
Although pointillistic art also uses dots and color, the dots actually consti-
tute, rather than merely outline, the sought after image, and color actually
determines, rather than merely fills in, what is seen.
In The Brandeis/Frankfurter Connection,1 the author uses relatively
few dots and purposefully locates them on the canvas. He then traces a
bold outline-Brandeis is Gepetto; Frankfurter, his marionette; money
serves as the strings; the performance is designed to circumvent ethical
norms. That outline permanently frames what is viewed and how it is to
be analyzed. To be sure, Murphy, with the reader's help, fills in the out-
line with color-anecdotes, thankfully brief snatches of bad psychohistory,
a description of the layout of Brandeis's chambers-but ultimately such
color proves irrelevant, or at any rate nonessential, to the basic image
presented.
The goal of the coloring book is to entertain, to involve, to foster a sense
of creativity (albeit a false one), and to lead to the discovery of a not very
hidden image. A mandatory feature of the genre is that the buyer joins in
the artistic enterprise. In so doing the consumer also buys into the "art-
work," and thus loses the capacity to criticize the principal artist's vision.
This vision, however, turns out to be not visionary at all but rather a
routine rendering of a stock pattern or image. In Murphy's book, the
reader is led on just such a course-to connect the dots and fill in the
image-in part by the author's persistent urgings, but in larger measure
t Associate Professor of Law, Yale University.




by Murphy's slightly more subtle appeals to the mistrust and fear of offi-
cialdom that our recent history seems to justify.' The impressionable
reader loses the capacity to see the joint enterprise for what, and how
little, it truly is.
A large part of our lay appreciation of pointillistic art comes from try-
ing to figure out how and why it works. We approach the canvas to ex-
plore the dabs of paint, then recede to a proper viewing distance to remind
ourselves of the artist's overall conception. We may feel a bit manipu-
lated-up close it is just dots-but we accept the work on its own terms as
art, not because the artist has co-opted us, but in large part because he
has hidden nothing from us and indeed has fairly invited our close inspec-
tion of the medium as well as the message. The last thing Bruce Allen
Murphy invites us to do is to look critically at his particular form of
historical rendering, or to cast a critical eye at the subject matter of his
book. And perhaps for good reason, because the former is problematic and
disappointing, and the latter infinitely more complicated than Murphy's
work would lead us to believe.
Two themes dominate the book: that first Brandeis, then Frankfurter,
engaged in injudicious political activity while on the bench, and that dur-
ing the twenty-plus years in which Brandeis was a Justice and Frank-
furter was not, the Harvard professor served as Brandeis's "paid political
lobbyist and lieutenant."' In Part I, I would like to focus on the second
theme, the "connection" between the two men that, together with a fair
amount of huckstering, has won for the book considerable attention in the
press.4 In Part II, which is devoted to the ethical issues flagged by the
book, I will return to the first theme.
I. The Justice and His "Lieutenant"
The principal flaw in Murphy's presentation is that he does not prove,
nor even fail in a valiant attempt to prove, that the much publicized con-
nection existed in anything like the form he suggests. It is hardly news
that Brandeis and Frankfurter had a close and enduring personal and
professional relationship during the period in question. Nor is it a revela-
tion, despite the ballyhoo in and about the book, that Brandeis supple-
mented Frankfurter's Harvard salary for two decades.5 On the other
2. Murphy begins The Brandeis/Frankfurter Connection by recounting the classically tragic tale
of Abe Fortas, thus making perfectly clear the biases that are to guide us as we move from dot to dot,
from incident to incident. Pp. 3-5.
3. P. 10.
4. Robert Cover develops this latter point in The Framing of Justice Brandeis, NEW REPUBLIC,
May 5, 1982, at 17.
5. Murphy admits as much in a footnote. P. 41 n.80.
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hand, the suggestion that there was something venal in all this-a sugges-
tion Murphy implicitly but unconvincingly disavows in his concluding
chapter-is new and startling. It is also highly irresponsible, absent a re-
spectable grounding in fact.
What was the money for? In a November, 1916 letter establishing the
financial arrangement, Brandeis wrote:
My dear Felix: You have had considerable expense for travelling,
telephoning and similar expenses in public matters undertaken at my
request or following up my suggestions and will doubtless have more
in the future no doubt. These expenses should, of course, be borne
by me. I am sending [a] check for $250 on this account. Let me
know when it is exhausted or if it has already been.'
After Frankfurter returned the check, Brandeis tendered it once again,
saying, in part:
In essence this is nothing different than your taking travelling and
incidental expenses from the Consumers League or the New Repub-
lic-which I trust you do. You are giving your very valuable time
and that is quite enough. It can make no difference that the subject
matter in connection with which the expense is incurred is more def-
inite in one case than in the other. I ought to feel free to make sug-
gestions to you, although they involve some incidental expense. And
you should feel free to incur expense in the public interest. So I am
returning the check.'
Taken at face value, these letters are subject to a range of interpreta-
tions, most of them reasonably benign. They reflect a wealthy man's con-
cern that his decidedly poorer comrade-in-arms is bearing the financial
brunt of worthwhile activities of mutual interest. Simply put, Brandeis, a
millionaire philanthropist, found in the similarly progressive Frankfurter
a worthy cause. But, says Murphy:
What makes this particular contribution to Felix Frankfurter so un-
usual is that it was designed to free Brandeis from the shackles of
remaining nonpolitical while on the bench and to permit him to en-
gage freely in political affairs simply by sending to Frankfurter a
letter filled with 'suggestions' for various programs.'
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specificity and programmatic nature of the suggestions they contained.
Whether and to what extent Brandeis thereby wielded political influence
and the propriety of so doing are important questions. Murphy deserves
credit for making it possible for us to think about them; however, his focus
on Brandeis's payments to Frankfurter taints and distorts that inquiry. As
the first letter quoted above makes evident, Brandeis made "suggestions"
to Frankfurter even before a financial arrangement existed, suggestions
Frankfurter apparently "follow[ed] up." The simple truth is that Bran-
deis did not have to pay Frankfurter, or anyone else for that matter, to
listen to or pursue his ideas. He was an extraordinary and extraordinarily
respected social thinker who inspired awe in many and commanded the
attention of all. Frankfurter, for his part, was by temperament more likely
to give of his considerable talent than to sell it; indeed, that is why Bran-
deis, if he is to be believed, shared the wealth.
Nevertheless, we are asked to conclude that Frankfurter somehow was
bought. Murphy does supply what could be a motive. In his rendering,
however, it is the motive, and it doubles as specific intent s well. We are
told that in October, 1916, scarcely four months after taking the oath of
office,
Brandeis realized that it would be impossible for him to continue
...[political] abstinence. The problem was how to remain influen-
tial in politics without violating any standards of judicial propriety.
.. .Brandeis decided that to act freely in the political sphere he
would need a lieutenant, one who would be his "eyes and ears" and
one who could help implement his programs. . . . Fortunately for
the justice, there was a friend and ally uniquely qualified for the job
in every way, . . . Felix Frankfurter.'
To be sure, this describes a possible consequence of the close relation-
ship between the Justice and the professor. Murphy's transformation of
that consequence into an animating force is stunning. Using verbs that
imply purposiveness, 0 the author enters into the subject's head without
having to rely on expressions or manifestations of the latter's actual
mental state. Similarly, he utilizes nouns that characterize and caricature
rather than describe.1
Murphy also elects to anchor his argument in assertions rather than in
solid (or even debatable) proof. For example, we are told that "[a]s the
expense of the lobbying effort rose, so did the amount of money sent by
9. P. 33 (emphasis added).
10. See id. Another such verb is "orchestrated." See p. 12.
11. For example, having said that Brandeis needed a "lieutenant," Murphy uses that term
throughout the book to refer to Frankfurter. See, e.g., pp. 33, 89.
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Brandeis for these purposes. In mid-1917 he placed $1000 in the special
account, and then replenished that amount in each of the next seven
years." 12 Yet Murphy offers no proof whatsoever that in 1917 Frank-
furter incurred greater lobbying expenses than in 1916 (when Brandeis
gave him only $250) or that such expenses rose, fell, or remained constant
over the next seven years. Murphy continues:
By this time, Frankfurter quite naturally came to depend on the
payments. More than this, the financial aspects of his relationship
with Brandeis led Frankfurter to view himself as an employee being
compensated for services rendered. Accordingly, when the need
arose, he had no qualms about asking the justice for a 'raise' in
1925.13
The italicized sentence is a naked assertion, and a critical one at that,
unsupported by anything that precedes or follows. As for the concluding
sentence, Frankfurter's painfully awkward letter advising Brandeis "after
considerable self-debate" of his need for $1500 per year to cover therapy
for his wife (she had suffered a nervous breakdown)14 is scarcely suscepti-
ble to so harsh or mercenary a reading.
When shorn of the corrupting influence of loose talk about money, the
connection between Brandeis and Frankfurter is endlessly fascinating.
Theirs is a story of professional and political kinship, paternal and filial
bonding, complex and occasionally conflicting loyalties, and mutual identi-
fication and admiration, the latter doubtless a rare and comforting experi-
ence for persons of such supreme talent and ego. Unfortunately, Murphy
plumbs little of this, not only because he has taken too much to heart
Deep Throat's dictum to "follow the money," but also because he seems
not to appreciate the complexity of the human psyche. Too often Brandeis
and Frankfurter are painted in two dimensions when three or four are
necessary for minimal comprehension. 5 This failing is especially acute in
a book that rests so heavily on subjective desires and motivations.
Finally, even if we understood perfectly what made our heroes tick and
what they meant to each other, there would remain the question of what
they did together. Regardless of their motivations and purposes, to what
extent did Frankfurter in effect serve as Brandeis's surrogate and in so
12. P. 41.
13. Id. (emphasis added).
14. P. 42.
15. Pp. 249-54. In a long passage intended to account for "the different approaches of Brandeis
and Frankfurter toward extrajudicial politics," p. 249, Murphy demonstrates that he car flesh out his
subjects, thus making his general failure to do so all the more galling. That failure not only leaves the
reader uncertain as to what the protagonists are really like; it also restricts one's capacity to assess
Murphy's characterizations of their motives and to develop alternative explanations for their conduct.
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doing free the latter "from the shackles of remaining nonpolitical while on
the bench?" 6 In frustration, I report that it is hard to say. Some answers
are easy. For example, Brandeis never used Frankfurter to influence the
outcome of pending cases; these they never discussed. Other matters, how-
ever, are more problematic. Murphy asserts, with seeming support, that
on occasion Brandeis engaged in legislative drafting through the medium
of Frankfurter and others. Professor Cover's scholarly examination of
Murphy's sources, however, casts considerable doubt on the author's con-
clusions (and, more generally, on his reliability). 17 Similarly, though
Brandeis's views on the merits of pending legislation were sometimes
passed along to receptive ears, Murphy's insistence on discussing such
"lobbying" in the most hyperbolic terms makes it difficult to determine its
true nature and magnitude. It is probably fair to say that Brandeis de-
lighted in suggesting to Frankfurter topics deserving scholarly exploration
and that he was not averse to citing articles he helped inspire. Murphy's
insistence on labeling Brandeis "virtually a collaborator"1" in such schol-
arship, however, tends to becloud and causes one to wonder how steep is
the author's slant.
Periodically, Murphy seems to attempt to correct some of his excesses.
Thus, despite suggesting throughout his work that Frankfurter was little
more than Brandeis's intellectual "gofer," Murphy concedes that "the
Harvard professor cannot be viewed solely as Brandeis's agent, in that he
became involved in a wide circle of issues and causes c.lhbres on his own
and in which the justice expressed no strong interest."1 Similarly, not-
withstanding his characterization of Brandeis as the self-conscious de-
signer of a mechanism to circumvent the ethical strictures of his judicial
role, Murphy acknowledges that "[miore than just being concerned about
public appearances . . .Brandeis was genuinely worried about conflicts
of interest."2 And in presenting in appendix form a "survey of justices in
politics from 1789 to 1916," a study that shows his subjects to be more the
rule than the exception, Murphy gives the lie to his claim in the introduc-
tory chapter that the extrajudicial behavior of Brandeis and Frankfurter
surpassed in range and extent "similar endeavors by all but a handful of
Supreme Court justices throughout the Court's history."'" This backing
and filling suggests that buried beneath this sensationalized tract there is a
more than competent and better than decent historian yearning to breathe
free. One has the sense that were it not for the prior success of Bernstein-
16. P. 41.
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Woodward-Armstrong, The Brandeis/Frankfurter Connection would be a
much less flawed book.
II. Extrajudicial Activity and Judicial Ethics
In taking on two of the giants of our industry, at least one of whom
virtually has been canonized, Murphy may well have provided an impetus
for their admirers to push hard on received wisdom about judicial ethics.
If so, he will have succeeded in focusing attention on deeply disturbing
issues of governance that we in the legal profession are loath to address
when left to our own devices.
A dozen years ago, the Court experienced a series of closely-spaced
shocks: the Senate's refusal to elevate Abe Fortas to the position of Chief
Justice, in large part because of his continuing role as Lyndon Johnson's
political adviser; Fortas's resignation in the face of revelations about his
financial and other ties to the Wolfson Foundation; the threat to impeach
Justice Douglas, fueled by his financial arrangements with the Parvin
Foundation; and the fate of nominees Haynsworth and Carswell. In re-
sponse, the bench and bar lurched into action, largely to forestall legisla-
tive oversight or reform, and produced inter alia a new Code of Judicial
Conduct,22 the first major revision since the original Canons were adopted
in 1924. To be sure, that spate of activity was reflected in the legal litera-
ture, but the resultant writings tended merely to evaluate pending propos-
als and suggest alternative means for responding to the crisis rather than
to reconceptualize basic problems. Moreover, even promising beginnings
became unfulfilled ends as the need to "do something" seemed to pass.
A. How to Think About Judicial Ethics
Perhaps a useful starting point is to ask why we even care about judi-
cial ethics. Which ideals do we seek to achieve, which specters to avoid?
What kind of a judiciary are we anxious to promote and safeguard? The
primary answer-that the judiciary should be independent of other insti-
tutions, interests, and persons-is no less profound because of its obvi-
ousness and generality. As an ideal, it is enshrined in the first Canon of
the Code" adopted in 1972 and is rooted in the functions we ask our
courts to perform-as arbiters of private disputes, rationalizers of public
controversies, enunciators of legal principles, elaborators of public values,
and guardians against the occasional majoritarian tyranny of coordinate
branches of government.
When we move beyond judicial independence, it is almost easier to de-
22. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1972) [hereinafter cited as CODE].
23. Id. Canon 1 ("A Judge should uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary.").
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fine our concerns negatively. We fear that judicial impropriety tarnishes a
court's image and limits its ability to command adherence to its pro-
nouncements. We worry about whether judges who engage in political
and other extrajudicial activities will shirk their judicial tasks and foster
intracourt tensions that inhibit open and honest debate and, where appro-
priate, consensus formation. We suspect that when judges are identified
with particular causes and concerns, litigants will cater to those predilec-
tions and preferences. Worse, we sense that political activism by judges
may tempt litigants to seek favors from their erstwhile political
confederates.
Once we have elaborated a core of concerns, we can begin to ask our-
selves what kinds of extrajudicial activities ought to trigger alarms. But
lest the above list be thought complete, or even satisfactorily illustrative, I
hasten to add that there are non-ethical judicial ideals we might espouse
that should affect what we view as ethically permissible. For example, we
might wish our judges to be bold, or creative, or perhaps politically savvy.
We might want them to be worldly, at least to the point of understanding
the contexts in which real-world controversies arise, so that they might
accurately gauge the efficacy of alternative remedies. And we might prefer
that judges be thoughtful-literally full of thought-even to the point of
having anticipated and worked through many of the issues likely to come
before them. Insofar as these various traits are desirable and are linked to
continued contact with the world outside the judicial cloister, it is folly to
settle on a conception of judicial ethics that does not nurture them.
Whatever the elements of the value matrix against which we would
choose to measure extrajudicial conduct, certain activities would surely be
judged plainly wrong. Judges ought not engage in partisan politics, save
to the limited extent necessary to further their own election. Nor should
judges function as political advisers; they should not take on tasks that are
essentially executive in character or involve themselves directly in the leg-
islative process.24 Judges should not discuss with outsiders cases pending
before the court or decide cases in which they have an interest, or have
previously been involved, or the merits of which they have prejudged.
With one possible exception,25 these activities are prohibited by the Code
of Judicial Conduct. But when it comes to the tougher issues, many of
which are spotlighted by the activities of Brandeis and Frankfurter, the
Code is woefully deficient.
24. See infra p. 1722.
25. See infra p. 1721.
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B. Judicial Participation in Public Debate
To what extent may judges engage in public debate on controversies
that have not crystallized into a case? Obviously, the greater the likelihood
that a case will ensue, the more nervous extrajudicial comment makes us.
But if we assume a set of circumstances somewhere in the middle, the
question does not admit of an easy answer.26 Some commentators have
suggested that when controversies are controversial, judges should remain
silent lest they embroil the court and diminish respect for it.2" Although
this proposition seems responsive to some of the values touched on above,
it does not necessarily deserve our ardent embrace. Certainly few would
argue that courts ought not decide actual cases just because they involve
controversial issues."8 And although a nice distinction can be made be-
tween looking for trouble and dealing with it when it is placed at one's
door, that distinction begs the question of whether it is sometimes appro-
priate for judges to involve themselves in out-of-court controversies. It
may well be that when public debate is fractious and issues hopelessly
distorted, and when people and institutions dependent on the electorate
find the pull toward demogoguery irresistible, politically sheltered judges
ought to step onto the public scene and give reason a voice.
Judges, of course, often address public controversies in the classroom
and in law journals.2" This differs from the conduct just discussed only in
form and forum. Moreover, when a judge writes an article in hopes of
bringing harmony to a troubled area of the law, the parallel to interven-
tion in tangled public debate is reasonably close.30 To the extent that we
26. Of the public issues to which Brandeis and Frankfurter devoted enormous energy, the one
Murphy treats most extensively and sympathetically, Zionism, was not likely to come before the
Court. Other controversies into which the Justices waded, however, including the evil of corporate
bigness against which Brandeis frequently inveighed, did, to no one's surprise, come before the Su-
preme Court.
27. Typically the suggestion is implicit. See McKay, The Judiciary and Nonjudicial Activities, 35
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 19, 25 (1970) (concluding that judges should refrain from nonjudicial
activities that "impair the dignity and prestige of the judicial office," and that judicial service on
public commissions dealing with "highly visible and sensitive" issues inevitably "diminish[es] the pres-
tige of the Court," but failing to consider whether public commentary on highly visible and sensitive
issues similarly diminishes prestige). But see Note, Extrajudicial Activity of Supreme Court Justices,
22 STAN. L. REV. 587, 601-03 (1970) (explicitly opposing public commentary and proposing "a mo-
nastic life for judges").
28. Lon Fuller is one of the few to advocate such a course. In The Forms and Limits of Adjudica-
tion, 92 HARv. L. REV. 353, 394-95 (1978), he asserts that certain kinds of "polycentric" cases, which
he likens to spider webs because of the interconnectedness of many parties and issues, are inherently
unsuited to adjudication.
29. The Code provides in pertinent part: "[A judge] may speak, write, lecture, teach, and partici-
pate in other activities concerning the law, the legal system, and the administration of justice." CODE,
supra note 22, Canon 4(A). Similarly, "[a] judge may write, lecture, teach, and speak on non-legal
subjects . . . if such avocational activities do not detract from the dignity of his office or interfere with
the performance of his judicial duties." Id. Canon 5(A).
30. In a thoughtful and candid treatment of this subject, Louisiana Supreme Court (now Fifth
Circuit) Judge Albert Tate, Jr., admits penning an article in an attempt to lead a recalcitrant bar and
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view the two activities differently, I wonder how successfully the distinc-
tion can be justified in terms of values served and genuine risks avoided.
Pushing the point a step further, should a distinction be made between
writings (or lectures or speeches) intended to clarify the law and writings
intended to undermine received wisdom, especially when the received wis-
dom is traceable to decisions rendered by one's own court?31 And does the
answer turn in part on whether the assault is oblique or frontal, on the
quality of the reasoning or the merit of the result?
C. Judicial Participation in Issue-Oriented Politics
A similarly hard issue is whether judges should be free to engage in
issue-oriented political activities, in, say, the struggle for civil rights,
human rights, or environmental integrity.32 Having recently strolled along
the Chesapeake & Ohio Canal, I confess great warmth toward Justice
Douglas for his prodigious efforts in preserving the towpath. It may be
that his decisions in environmental cases were affected by his direct in-
volvement in the issue, but so too, in reverse, were the decisions of those of
his brethren whose direct environmental experience was limited to mow-
ing the lawn. Canon 5(A) encourages judges to engage in "avocational"
activities such as "the arts, sports, and other social and recreational activi-
ties" so long as they neither "detract from the dignity of. . . [the judicial]
office [n]or interfere with the performance . . . of [their] judicial du-
ties."'3 3 The accompanying commentary asserts that "[c]omplete separation
of a judge from extrajudicial activities is neither possible nor wise; he
should not become isolated from the society in which he lives."34 If these
are wise words, should they not apply as well to matters that matter, to
the things we call political rather than avocational?
D. Judges as Mentors
A third troublesome issue, one that is often insensitively handled in The
oblivious bench to accept certain rule changes. Tate, The Propriety of Off-Bench Judicial Writing or
Speaking on Legal or Quasi-Legal Issues, 1978 J. LEGAL PROF. 17.
31. Murphy accuses Brandeis of indirectly doing the latter by urging Frankfurter to write a law
review article paralleling his dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928) (Bran-
deis, J., dissenting). See p. 88.
32. It is difficult to tell where the Code deals with this question. Canon 5, which deals with
extrajudicial activities, does not address issue-oriented politics. Canon 7 states: "A judge should re-
frain from political activity inappropriate to his office." Its text seems to focus on partisan politics but
includes a general proscription on political activity: "A judge should not engage in any . . . political
activity [other than the minimum needed to serve as a delegate to a state constitutional convention or
for election to judicial office] except on behalf of measures to improve the law, the legal system, or the
administration of justice." This proscription seems broad enough to prohibit involvement in issue-
oriented politics as well. CODE, supra note 22, Canons 5, 7, 7(A)(4).
33. CODE, supra note 22, Canon 5(A).
34. Id. commentary.
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Brandeis/Frankfurter Connection, is the serious potential for abuse inher-
ent in the special relationship between judges and former law clerks, be-
tween professors and favorite students. Murphy is aware that such rela-
tionships can be heartfelt, broadly reciprocal, multi-dimensional, and
dynamic." However, in his eagerness to tie Justices Brandeis and Frank-
furter to the subsequent political activities of their proteges, Murphy re-
peatedly characterizes the least effort by one of the Justices to further the
career of a former clerk or student as a cynical attempt to create a net-
work of loyal disciples, thereby extending his political influence. Political
statements and actions taken by former clerks or students that are consis-
tent with what Murphy takes to be the wishes or interests of their men-
tors are said to reflect continued enthrallment with the Justices and their
political views.3 6 Yet the professional parent-child relationship, like the
personal one, is infinitely richer and more complicated than Murphy's
account would suggest. Children grow up and, in the process, even as they
replicate their elders, proclaim and exhibit independence; parents respond
in a variety of ways, but the wisest among them adjust to such changes
and enter into a multiple-bonded relationship in which similarities and
differences, approval and disapproval, all wash together.
I take it that none of us would prohibit judges from providing career
advice and letters of recommendation for former clerks. Nor would we bar
them from keeping abreast of the activities of these subordinates-turned-
peers. Yet, unless a judge regularly selects clerks who remain total ci-
phers-a prospect that would cause us to wonder about the judge or the
quality of her judicial output-there is a substantial risk that keeping up
with them will cause the judge to interact with policymakers, political
actors, and potential litigants. That risk, it seems to me, must be borne.
To be sure, there is a line between genuine mentoring (or peer friendships
for that matter) and influence-peddling, but there is no good reason to
draw the line hard against the formation and continuation of meaningful
relationships.3
35. See p. 77.
36. See, e.g., pp. 112-14, 117-20, 220-21, 234-35, 272.
37. The Code speaks to this problem at a level of generality that is not especially helpful except to
convey a tone:
A judge should not allow his family, social, or other relationships to influence his judicial
conduct or judgment. He should not lend the prestige of his office to advance the private
interests of others; nor should he convey or permit others to convey the impression that they
are in a special position to influence him. He should not testify voluntarily as a character
witness.
CODE, supra note 22, Canon 2(B).
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E. Reliance on Outside Legal Experts
Judges, of course, regularly benefit from the professional development
of former law clerks. It is not unheard of for a judge to appoint a former
clerk as counsel for an indigent in a proceeding in which there is no pro-
vision for state- or loser-paid attorney's fees.S It is also not unheard of for
a judge to consult with a former clerk on a point of law, particularly if the
clerk has entered academe. Murphy takes the Justices to task for using
former clerks as resources, though the expertise sought typically was polit-
ical rather than legal."9 He does not, however, pinpoint the impropriety, a
failing that masks what turns out to be a rather complicated ethical prob-
lem. Assuming that it would have been improper for the Justices to en-
gage directly in political activities, it would seem at first blush that it was
improper for them to do so through their former clerks. But that depends
in part on why, if at all, direct political involvement by judges is bad. To
the extent we scorn such involvement because it may give rise to the ap-
pearance of impropriety-the public may conclude that judges are biased,
inflexible, or otherwise flawed even when objectively they are not-then
subterranean activity may be quite acceptable. To the extent we view sur-
reptitiousness as itself undesirable, however, a paradox results. It is ac-
ceptable for X to engage in certain activity so long as Y is kept ignorant of
it; it is wrong for X to take steps to insure that Y will remain ignorant;
therefore, it is wrong for X to engage in the activity. This paradox crops
up, unexplored, throughout The Brandeis/Frankfurter Connection as
Murphy criticizes Brandeis for exercising extreme discretion in pursuing
extrajudicial activities and criticizes Frankfurter for not being discreet."'
Of course there are at least two ways out of this box-to conclude that
political activity by judges is inherently evil or to conclude that secrecy is
acceptable. My goal here is neither to support nor to attack either escape
route, but simply to point out the lurking difficulty.
The dilemma posed by Brandeis's use of Frankfurter's scholarly talents
while the latter was a professor is similar. If judicial reliance on outside
research or analysis involves no inherent impropriety but risks the appear-
ance of impropriety, then so long as a judge maintains the secrecy of the
link, no ethical harm is done. If we believe, however, that parties to a
38. There is, I take it, no necessary harm in this, though I would not be anxious to have a judge's
former clerk as my adversary. From the former clerk's perspective, however, any possible advantage
may scarcely be worth the near-paralyzing fear of disappointing the judge.
39. To be sure, some activities, legislative drafting for one, blur the distinction. With Professor
Frankfurter always available, Justice Brandeis of course had no need to rely on former clerks for
research assistance. The ethics of using former clerks in that capacity, however, strikes me as no
different from the ethics of relying on an outside researcher with whom a judge has had no prior
formal connection. See infra p. 1720.
40. See, e.g., pp. 10-11, 55, 343-44.
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dispute should have an opportunity to test and challenge any datum that
could appreciably affect a judge's decision, then secrecy is inappropriate.
Whether we accept either of these propositions and, if so, how broadly we
would extend them, is of course debatable. My point is simply that these
issues should be debated and clearly understood, if not resolved, before we
attempt to judge the conduct of Brandeis and Frankfurter or, more impor-
tantly, to fix standards for the future.
In considering whether resort to outside legal experts is inherently im-
proper, one should draw a distinction between general consultation and
that connected with an actual case. The former is difficult to distinguish
from acceptable and indeed desirable continuing professional education, as
when a judge attends a judicial institute. A further distinction should be
drawn between case-specific consultations in which the expert is told or
can determine the identity of the case and/or the parties to it, and consul-
tations that are blind. In the latter, there is little risk that the expert will
be influenced by personal interests or be tempted to exploit confidential
information. But even in such circumstances, whether the judge is likely to
be unduly, or perhaps even duly, influenced by the expert is a key con-
cern. Of course we do not worry about whether judges will be mesmerized
by Wigmore, but perhaps that is because litigants can fairly anticipate
that possibility and have full access to his treatise. The argument for al-
lowing resort to-live- legal experts is in part premised on the notion that a
judge, even in isolation from contending adversaries, is equipped to evalu-
ate the expert's offerings. On the other hand, while it is true that judges
and legal scholars share a common language and a general framework,
the very fact that a judge has chosen to reach out casts some doubt on her
capacity to sort out independently the matter at issue.
The proposition that disputants should have an opportunity to chal-
lenge every possible determinant of their case is similarly thorny. Quite
obviously we do not permit counsel to cross-examine a judge's law clerks
or professional siblings to determine if one of them has led the judge
astray. Yet there is much force, some of it of constitutional origin, in the
notion that litigants have a right to meet arguments marshaled against
them. Even from the perspective of the bench, one might argue that sub-
jecting expert legal opinion to the adversary process will improve the
court's ultimate product. That alone, however, would not justify a rule
banning ex parte contact with outside scholars since, even absent such a
rule, a judge could give the parties notice and an opportunity to be
heard."'
41. The .difficulty of these issues is reflected in the fact that a special committee of the Association
of American Law Schools, appointed to review the proposed Code, divided sharply over a draft provi-
sion prohibiting ex parte resort to legal experts. See Weckstein, Introductory Observations on the
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F. The Code's Distinction Between Extrajudicial and Quasi-Judicial
Activity
This brief survey of some of the ethical issues raised by The Brandeis/
Frankfurter Connection suggests a number of problems deserving schol-
arly attention. In my view, any attempt to parse them should take into
account the Code of Judicial Conduct, not because it adequately deals
with most of the questions worth pursuing, but because it draws a funda-
mental distinction that radically, and I think erroneously, frames how
lawyers think about such questions.
In essence, the Code distinguishes "extra-judicial" and "quasi-judicial"
activities, condemning the former while encouraging the latter. Thus, Ca-
non 5 prohibits a judge from serving as a fiduciary (except on behalf of a
family member), from acting as an arbitrator or mediator, and from prac-
ticing law or accepting governmental appointments "on matters other than
the improvement of the law, the legal system, or the administration of
justice."' 42 In addition, it severely restricts financial activities and limits
"civic and charitable" efforts. 43 On the other hand, Canon 4 permits, and
in the accompanying commentary encourages, judges to speak, write, lec-
ture, teach, appear at public hearings, make funding recommendations,
and serve on boards, so long as the focus of their activity is the law, the
legal system, or the administration of justice. It also permits judges to
"otherwise consult with an executive or legislative body or official" on
matters concerning the administration of justice.44
The free reign thus given to quasi-judicial conduct,' 5 as against extraju-
dicial and political activity,' is, it strikes me, unjustified. The assumption
that participation in law-related activities is not political or does not raise
the same risks as political activity is facile, if not false.47 When the Chief
Code of Judicial Conduct, 9 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 785, 787-90 (1972). The Code as ultimately enacted
by the ABA provides, in pertinent part:
A judge should... neither initiate nor consider ex parte or other communications concerning a
pending or impending proceeding. A judge, however, may obtain the advice of a disinterested
expert on the law applicable to a proceeding before him if he gives notice to the parties of the
person consulted and the substance of the advice, and affords the parties reasonable opportu-
nity to respond.
CODE, supra note 22, Canon 3(A)(4).
42. CODE, supra note 22, Canon 5(G).
43. Id. Canon 5(B).
44. Id. Canon 4(B).
45. The term is something of a misnomer since the Code characterizes serving as an arbitrator as
"extra-judicial" despite its adjudicative quality, see id. Canon 5(E), yet presumably treats all speeches
on law-related topics, no matter how far removed from the business of courts, as "quasi-judicial." See
id. Canon 4(A).
46. I have in mind issue-oriented political activity, which could fall either under Canon 5 (which
discourages extrajudicial activities) or Canon 7(A)(4) (which prohibits most political activity). See
supra note 32.
47. The Tentative Draft of the Code explicitly made a similar distinction in the Commentary
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Justice sounds a clarion call to end the "reign of terror in American cit-
ies" caused by crime and proposes inter alia a broadening of pretrial de-
tention and a narrowing of the availability of habeas corpus, 4  and when
that call is immediately picked up by the President who appoints a task
force that makes recommendations that include the Chief Justice's propos-
als,49 it is difficult to separate quasi-judicial activity from politics. Simi-
larly, were a judge to support or oppose a bill regulating or deregulating
an industry, an observer would be forgiven for viewing the act in "politi-
cal" rather than "legal" terms. More troubling still is the prospect of a
judge of the chairperson's choice testifying before a congressional commit-
tee on the evils (or virtues) of, say, busing as a remedy in school desegre-
gation suits. I am not suggesting that judges should not be permitted to
engage in public debate on law-related topics. I merely question distin-
guishing law-related topics from others. It might be argued that whatever
the dangers, the rewards of having learned judges address legal issues tip
the balance. On many such topics, however, most judges have less to offer
than is comfortable to admit. This of course would not justify gagging
judges altogether, but it does suggest that when a balance is being struck,
presumptive expertise ought not be given heavy weight.
Whatever the appropriate rule regarding public commentary, the
Code's invitation to judges to involve themselves in executive and legisla-
tive decision-making on law-related issues poses a serious threat to the
cardinal value of judicial independence. Even though the invitation does
not extend, I take it, to statute drafting, particularly when the proposed
statute is intended to overrule a prior court decision,50 were a judge to
couch such a proposal in terms of the administration of justice-by, for
example, withdrawing from courts the power to order affirmative action
in primary discrimination suits or to adjudicate claims that affirmative
action plans are not being implemented-she would be free under the
Code to draft and lobby away. Moreover, she could simply "otherwise
consult with" a sympathetic legislator and thereby propose legislation
through a back channel. To be sure, it would be improper for the judge to
accompanying Canon 3:
This Canon authorizes but does not require a judge to consult with legislative and executive
bodies and officials, and to testify before legislative committees, on matters affecting judicial
administration. It does not permit such consultations or appearances concerning matters other
than judicial administration, because such matters may become partisan or political.
CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 3 commentary (Tentative Draft May 1971) (emphasis added).
48. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1981, at Al, col. 4.
49. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 18, 1981, at Al, col. 4; Feb. 11, 1981, at Al, col. 5.
50. The California Judicial Commission, however, recently refused to censure a state supreme
court justice for drafting and submitting to a legislative committee a state constitutional amendment
banning affirmative action by state and state-supported agencies and programs. See L.A. Times, Feb.
24, 1982, § 1, at 3, col. 1.
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later pass on the scope or constitutionality of the bill or amendment
should it be enacted, 1 but even at the proposing stage there seems to be
an overlapping and intertwining of responsibilities that run contrary to
the structure of our government and undermine the roles we ask the judi-
ciary to fill. And the same is true, though admittedly to a lesser extent, of
unfettered (save that it be law-related) judicial involvement in the execu-
tive's or the legislature's sphere, even when it does not rise to the level of
drafting or lobbying.
Finally, in giving especially favored status to activities directed at the
administration of justice, the drafters of the Code of Judicial Conduct may
well have made a serious error. Here, of course, the presumption of spe-
cial expertise is clearly warranted. But it is precisely when the adminis-
tration of justice is at issue that judges can be expected to be least dispas-
sionate and most self-interested. Can, for example, the views of Supreme
Court Justices and circuit court judges on the prospect of a national court
of appeals remain unaffected by their individual and institutional concerns
about workload, job content, and status? Can judges' views on the confer-
ral or withdrawal by legislatures of their jurisdiction ever be unalloyed?
Can the Chief Justice's vigorous eleventh hour lobbying to dissuade Con-
gress from giving bankruptcy judges anything approaching Article III sta-
tus52 be viewed wholly on the merits? Moreover, the further we move
away from matters directly affecting the courts' work, the more it is that
activities designed to further the administration of justice look just like
activities directed toward general law reform, which in turn shade into
political activities generally. Thus, for example, a judicial call for grand
jury reform is hard to distinguish, despite its better than arguable rela-
tionship to the administration of justice, from a judicial proposal to alter
the Federal Communication Commission's fairness doctrine. I hasten to
add that where the judiciary has a true institutional interest in the admin-
istration of justice read narrowly (or court administration read broadly), it
should be able to protect that interest and express and support its views.
But I tend to think that on such matters one voice is better than many and
51. Indeed, it would seem improper for a judge to sit in judgment of a statute whose passage she
played any appreciable role in furthering. Murphy takes Brandeis to task for allegedly doing just that,
pp. 54-55, though as Professor Cover demonstrates, supra note 4, at 19-20, the single example offered
by Murphy rests on a severely strained reading of Brandeis's involvement. It would seem equally
inappropriate for a judge to pass on a statute that she actively opposed. But see infra note 52 (discuss-
ing Chief Justice Burger's actions).
52. See Klee, Legislative History of the New Bankruptcy Law, 28 DE PAUL L. REVI 941, 954-57
(1979). Subsequently, the Chief Justice participated in the Court's consideration of whether the bank-
ruptcy judges created by the statute he opposed, could, consistent with Articles I and III, conduct
plenary proceedings involving claims by and against a bankrupt's estate. A plurality answered in the
negative; two Justices concurred in that view when, as in the case there at bar, the collateral action
involved only state law issues. The Chief Justice and two other Justices dissented. Northern Pipeline
Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 102 S. Ct. 2858 (1982).
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a formal public channel better than an informal or private one. There is
much to be said for channeling true quasi-judicial activity through judicial
conferences or their equivalent, assuming they are democratic and allow
for the expression and publication of minority views.
Conclusion
One cannot read The Brandeis/Frankfurter Connection without being
struck by how amazingly accomplished both men would have been (or
were, depending upon how much of Murphy's speculation and construc-
tion one credits) as social thinkers, politicians, and statesmen. I found my-
self repeatedly thinking that they pursued the wrong careers and then
recalling that they were pretty fair Justices as well. This brings me to the
concluding point: in contemplating what kinds and degrees of extrajudicial
involvement are tolerable (or desirable), should we make allowances for
extraordinary people? The question would be simple were we to assume
that those who violate ethical rules necessarily disturb the values underly-
ing them. But that is not so, as Murphy concedes in his concluding
chapter:
My contention that Brandeis and Frankfurter wielded, in camera,
enormous political influence through their extensive off-the-bench
political activities does not accuse either man of deciding cases before
the Supreme Court to suit his own perception of political rectitude.
Ironically (but likely not coincidentally), both Brandeis and Frank-
furter should properly be classified among those justices who were
best able to separate their political views from their judicial deci-
sions. Brandeis was clearly able to make the distinction between
what he would like to see come about and what he had a right to
help bring about with his from-the-bench vote. Within expected lim-
its of human frailty, he generally respected this distinction. And
Frankfurter is perceived by many students of the Court as even more
concerned than Brandeis that the court not expand its powers.53
So, the question remains: when presented with a born politician or states-
man (like Frankfurter and Brandeis, respectively) who also happens to be
splendidly suited by training, experience, temperament, and intellectual
gifts to serve on the Court, and whom we can trust to respect the Court as
an institution and the core values on which it is premised, should we al-
low this prodigious talent to be set loose rather than stifled, maximized
rather than squandered? Seductive as is the prospect of Louis Brandeis in
the role of philosopher king, I share what I take to be Murphy's negative
53. Pp. 341-42.
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response. Perhaps it is because the Brandeises are too few and far be-
tween, and through a door opened wide enough for them would pour a
thousand lesser characters. Perhaps it is a sense that one great judge is
counterbalanced by two, or three, or ten lousy ones. Or maybe it is simply
the recognition that even a Brandeis, left uncontrolled, is a threat to much
we hold dear. And as I answer in the negative I cannot help but feel that
there is, in all of this, something rather sad.
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Israel and Palestine: Assault on the Law
of Nations?
Israel and Palestine: Assault on the Law of Nations. By Julius
Stone. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981. Pp. xiii,
223. $17.50.
Anthony D'Amatot
Despite the critical importance of the Israel-Palestine problem and the
complexity of the legal issues surrounding it, there is a dearth of writing
on the central issues of international law involved, and the little that is
there is marred by selectivity and bias. Perhaps scholars fear that any fair
characterization of their opponents' contentions will be cited out of con-
text, like a quote from a critic in a theater advertisement. Opposing views
are caricatured or ignored. And since the criticism scholars justly receive is
equally one-sided and negative, the writer may feel relieved of the burden
of fashioning truly persuasive counterarguments.
One opens Professor Julius Stone's latest book with a hopeful feeling: is
this at last a good piece of scholarship on the Middle East? Stone's cre-
dentials, as he states in this book, are impressive:
The present writer's concern with the sociology of international
law-to the relation of its socioeconomic, political, and psychological
substructure to its surface manifestations, is of long standing. It goes
back to his Master of Laws thesis about "The Doctrine of Sover-
eignty and the League of Nations" at the University of Leeds in
1930, and has continued through books on Legal Controls of Inter-
national Conflict . . . and other writings. He has also contributed
much in the last decade to the literature on particular legal aspects of
the Arab-Israel conflict.'
The "socioeconomic, political, and psychological substructure" Stone
examines turns out to be simply the 1973 Arab oil boycott. He argues that
t Professor of Law, Northwestern University. In 1981, Professor D'Amato contended that the
Israeli bombing of the nuclear facility in Iraq was not in violation of international law. The Israeli
Air Strike: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign. Relations, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 85-88
(1981).
i. J. STONE, ISRAEL AND PALESTINE: ASSAULT ON THE LAW OF NATIONS 6 (1981) [hereinafter
cited by page number only].
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this Arab "weapon" so tainted majorities voting for anti-Israel resolutions
in the General Assembly of the United Nations (U.N.) that those resolu-
tions amount to an assault on the law of nations. By calling for self-deter-
mination for Palestinian Arabs and the establishment of a Palestinian
state, the resolutions, Stone contends, have created a nonexistent problem.
I. The Arab Oil Weapon and the U.N. "Assault on the Law of
Nations"
Before the boycott, there was no problem of a separate Palestinian
homeland, Stone insists, because Palestinian Arabs had their natural
homeland in Jordan.' The problem was created by General Assembly res-
olutions passed after 1973 by states "under extreme duress such as threats
of deprivation of essential oil supplies."3 Since such coercion "must be
unlawful" when used to compel the foreign policy of sovereign states, the
Arab oil boycott "was an invasion of the sovereign prerogatives of the
third states by the use of coercion no less extreme than most conventional
military aggressions."4 The oil boycott, Stone concludes, was "economic
aggression, stricto sensu,"5 and thus "probably constituted a threat or use
of force forbidden by Article 2(4) of the [U.N.'s] charter. '
One need not be an expert in socioeconomic substructures to know that
the oil boycott has undoubtedly influenced nations toward a pro-Arab po-
sition since 1973. But was the boycott illegal? Was it a threat or use of
force in violation of the most fundamental prohibition in the U.N.
Charter?
Stone fails to consider the widespread use of economic muscle by other
powers to influence U.N. votes in particular and foreign policy generally.
The United States, for instance, has for many years "bought votes" in the
U.N. through its foreign aid programs; it has prohibited grain sales to the
Soviet Union from time to time, in hopes of changing the latter's policies;
2. Stone writes:
[T~he origins and present position of the Arab state of Jordan in Palestine rebut the very claim
that the Palestinian people lack a homeland. Not only did the state of Jordan arise in Palestine
over Jewish protest at the expense of the home allocated for the Jewish nation; it also inexora-
bly became, by the same course of history, a Palestine Arab state.. . . With or without the
West Bank, Jordan is unambiguously Palestinian territor]; and the vast majority-something
over 60 percent-of its inhabitants consists of Palestinian Arabs. Moreover, the number of





6. P. 38. The Charter of the United Nations states that: "All Members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political inde-
pendence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."
U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
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it has engaged in many acts of apparent "economic aggression." Yet no
one claims that these actions were illegal; and even if such food or oil
boycotts were questionable, perhaps as human rights violations, they still
would not necessarily constitute a threat or use of force under Article 2(4).
Though Stone claims that the oil boycott is economic aggression, as that
term was used by "many participating States" in the discussions leading
up to the 1974 U.N. Resolution on the Definition of Agression,7 the reso-
lution itself omits any mention or intimation of economic aggression. The
states arguing for the inclusion of such boycotts in the definition of "ag-
gression" lost.8
The U.N. resolutions decried by Stone did focus world attention on the
Palestinian Arabs, but it is wrong to conclude that through these resolu-
tions the new holders of oil wealth created the Palestinian problem. Prior
to 1973, the Palestinian Arabs were simply ignored by the other Arab
states." The unprecedented wealth accruing to some Arab states as a result
of the formation of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
did not suddenly sensitize them to the plight of the Palestinian Arabs. Nor
were these states lying in wait, pace Stone, to use their new boycott to
coerce other nations to aid the Palestinians. Rather, the very human prob-
lem of the Palestinians could simply no longer be ignored.1°
II. The Palestinian "Problem" and the Jordanian "Solution"
The real reason a "problem" was created for Israel after 1973 was that
the Palestinian Arabs became identified as an entity. The General Assem-
bly resolutions, whatever their legal effect, helped create the aura of in-
choate nationhood for the Palestinians.
As long as the Palestinian Arabs could be dealt with as a large group of
7. P. 37.
8. Stone mentions that the Soviet Union, in particular, has long called for inclusion of "economic
aggression" in the definition of aggression. Pp. 36-37. But he fails to mention that the Soviets have
also wanted to include "cultural aggression" in the list of proscribed activities. In fact, the Soviets may
have simply tried to overwhelm the enterprise of defining aggression by universal inclusivity.
9. In 1970, Professor Michael Reisman called attention to the problem:
The only group in the contemporary Middle Eastern situation with a legitimate grievance is
the Palestinian Arabs. By a complex convergence of circumstances, they have been denied the
opportunity for self-determination and for twenty years have lived in the most degraded condi-
tions. Despite constant expressions of verbal sympathy, they have been despised by the other
Arab peoples and have learned to despise themselves . . . . An equitable solution to the prob-
lem of the Palestinian Arabs is not only an exigent moral demand but also a crucial require-
ment for increasing stability in the Middle East.
M. REISMAN, THE ART OF THE POSSIBLE 44 (1970).
10. Inconvenient as it may be for Stone's oil-boycott thesis, the General Assembly's first Palestin-
ian resolution was Resolution 2672, of December 8, 1970, which recognized that the "people of Pales-
tine are entitled to equal rights and self-determination." The war of October 1973 and the terrorist
activities of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) beginning in 1970 also contributed to in-
creased world attention to the plight of the Palestinian Arabs.
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stateless persons, they could be moved around and relocated among the
various states in the Middle East. Israel has consistently been willing to
negotiate with other states, no matter how indirect their interest in the
Palestinians. Israel adopted this stance during and after the Camp David
talks, when it was willing to address the fate of the Palestinians, as long
as the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was not present.
Stone's book parallels in legal language this real-world finessing of the
Palestinians. His approach reduces international law to a law among na-
tions; non-national groups such as the Palestinians have no status in such
a scheme. Trying to give them one creates the problem. In Stone's view,
the sovereign prerogatives of Israel have to be given the same status as is
given to the prerogatives of Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Egypt, and the other
established states in the area. No one else has any standing. Legally
speaking, the Palestinians do not exist. To pretend that they do is to as-
sault the law of nations.
III. The Legal Framework of the Mandate Regime
The central unresolved issue in the Arab-Israel conflict is what to do
with the Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Stone's solu-
tion cedes these lands to Israel; Palestinian Arabs who do not like Israeli
rule can move to Jordan. Although Jordan administered the West Bank
from 1948 to 1967, it acquired no title, according to Stone, since its entry
was illegal. Hence, Jordan's claim to the West Bank is no better than
Israel's, and Israel is "under no obligation to hand 'back' automatically
the West Bank and Gaza to Jordan or anyone else."" This chain of rea-
soning is valid only if one interprets "anyone" as any other state. The
only title superior to Israel's lies not with some other state but with the
Palestinian Arabs themselves. If they do not count under the "law of na-
tions," Israel's occupation and control over the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip is not defeasible by any superior right.
Stone's "solution" seems prescient. Israel's incursion into Lebanon in
the summer of 1982 and its successful dispersal of the PLO have shifted
attention eastward to Jordan. Prime Minister Begin seems determined to
annex the West Bank and to expel discontented Palestinians to Jordan.
This policy would be abetted by the historical treatment of Jordan in
Stone's book.
Under Stone's interpretation, there were two claimants to the territories
removed from Turkish hegemony after the first World War: the "Jews"
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ish government to "the establishment in Palestine of a national home for
the Jewish people."13 This "Palestine" in 1917 comprised 46,399 square
miles on both sides of the Jordan River. Stone calls this a "minute frac-
tion" of the total land to be taken from Turkey and argues that "that tiny
fraction was then reduced by four-fifths in 1922, to create in Palestine
what is now called the State of Jordan, leaving the share of the Jewish
people . . . as 10,871 square miles-or about one two-hundredth of the
entire territory distributed. 1' 4 Because the State of Jordan "arose as a
last-minute encroachment on the already small allocation to the Jewish
nation," 5 its formation was intended to provide a "reserve of land for
Arabs across the Jordan.""6 Hence Jordan has a "duty . . . as an Arab
state in Palestine to accommodate the Palestinians.""
Stone's reconstruction is a castle of sand in the Sahara. In the first
place, there were, in addition to the Arabs and Jews, other claimants to
the territories removed from Turkey. The Kurds, Armenians, Assyrians,
and Chaldeans all received promises of autonomy from the Allies."8
Promises were made by many governments on many levels as various reli-
gious-ethnic groups chose (and sometimes switched) sides in the waning
years of World War I.
Nor did the Balfour Declaration "allocate" Palestine to the Jews, as
Stone claims. By its terms, it allowed for a Jewish national home "in"
Palestine. The declaration goes on to assert that it is "clearly understood
that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious
rights of the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine.""l
Stone also fails to mention that when the state of Jordan was provided
for in 1922, the Turkish territories had not yet been given over to the
Allies. This cession occurred only in 1923 with the Treaty of Lausanne.2"
All pre-1923 maneuverings represent at best statements of intent, not
binding commitments. When the Allied powers met in the League of Na-
tions, they decided that the initial plan to include all of the land formerly
under Turkish hegemony in one mandate proved unworkable and decided
on administrative grounds to split the lands east of the Jordan River from
the Mandate. This effectively gave Jews a smaller area to which they






18. See R. STAFFORD, THE TRAGEDY OF THE ASSYRIANS 74-81 (1975). The Assyrians later




Vol. 91: 1726, 1982
Israel and Palestine
the state of Jordan to admit Palestinian Arabs from the other side of the
river to provide room for Jewish emigration.21
Moreover, the figures given by Stone-the Jews only received one two-
hundredth of the land of the former Turkish territories-are quite mis-
leading. Presumably, the Zionists could have received a much larger area
had they wanted to settle in an uninhabited part of those vast territories.
Neither Jews nor Arabs were much interested in the expanses of desert
land included in Stone's statistics.
The new Palestine Mandate was also a most unusual arrangement. All
the other mandates set up by the League of Nations were trust arrange-
ments designed for the welfare of the "inhabitants" of the territories. But
the Palestine Mandate explicitly envisaged immigration to the newly cre-
ated territory. Consequently, a unique and intractable problem arose for
the British authorities in Palestine. Throughout the 1920's and 1930's,
increasing Jewish immigration led to rioting by Palestinian Arabs which
had to be suppressed by military force. Though the British responded by
restricting Jewish immigration, the situation continually worsened. The
end of World War II brought another wave of Jewish immigrants, most
of them illegal. Britain could no longer contain the problem. A U.N. par-
tition resolution was passed in 1947, giving fifty-seven percent of Palestine
to the Jews, who represented one-third of the population. The partition,
however, was never implemented. The British pulled out, Israel pro-
claimed its statehood, the Arab nations invaded, and by 1949 Israel had
won a military victory and additional territory in Palestine. Hundreds of
thousands of Palestinians became refugees.
For quite divergent reasons, neither the Palestinian Arabs nor the Is-
raelis have wanted to focus on or give legal credit to the history of Pales-
tine as a League of Nations Mandate. To the Arabs the entire history of
the Middle East in the twentieth century is of Jewish encroachment upon
their homeland. The Balfour Declaration, the Mandate, the declaration of
the existence of Israel, and the periodic wars from 1948 to 1982 are
symptomatic of Western interference, usurpation, and conquest.
On the other hand, Stone's book echoes the current Israeli downgrading
of the history of the Mandate. For the more that history is cited, the more
legitimate appear the claims of Palestinian Arabs to the West Bank, the
Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem. Palestinian Arabs, after all, inhabited
those territories in 1922, when the Mandate was created; additionally, the
Mandate was intended to protect the Arabs as well as to provide a home-
land for Jews. Stone's strategy, like the Israeli government's, seems plain:
21. There is some force, though, to the argument that with the splitting-off of Jordan, a stronger
Jewish claim could be made to the remaining territory.
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if Israel intends to annex the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem,
or other territories, the less said about the international law of the Man-
date the better.
IV. Nature of the Palestinian Claims
Both sides are wrong. The Arabs are being monumentally foolish, and
Stone is betraying a life of scholarship to peddle a political position. All of
it seems of a piece. The PLO has steadfastly refused to recognize the
legitimacy of the state of Israel,22 thus giving the Israelis a ready and
effective excuse not to negotiate. As a result, the PLO has undercut its
own claim to legitimacy and has set back the cause of the Palestinian
Arabs. And the Palestinian Arabs, instead of basing their legal defense on
the terms of the Mandate, or even those of the Partition, have rallied
behind self-determination as their international-law banner. Unfortu-
nately, however, "self-determination" is a most elusive, undefinable, and,
ultimately, unhelpful concept. There are hundreds of minority enclaves in
nations throughout the world, each proclaiming a right of self-determina-
tion and a right to an independent "homeland." 2' But the problems of
such claims are as intractable as they were for President Lincoln in 1861,
when he denied self-determination to the South. Self-determination, in
short, has an emotional ring, but as a legal concept it is about as helpful
as the term "people's democracy."
The Palestinian Arabs have not suffered at the hands of international
law in the twentieth century, despite their emotional assertions to the con-
trary. In 1917 the Ottoman Empire had been sovereign over Palestine for
four hundred years. If the Turks had decreed that Jews from all over the
world could immigrate to Palestine, the Palestinian Arabs could not have
objected under recognized principles of international law. With the defeat
of Turkey in World War I, sovereignty passed to the Allied Powers. They
could have annexed the Arab lands. Instead, they created mandates that
soon became independent Arab nations. Since the Allies had the power to
annex these lands, they had the power to attach conditions to the man-
dates' independence. If one of the conditions of the eventual independence
of Palestine was a mandate regime that allowed for Jewish immigration,
again there could have been no legal complaint.
Nor do the Palestinian Arabs have any legal basis to complain about
the U.N. partition plan of 1947. Even though the partition gave fifty-
seven percent of Palestine to the Jews, who numbered only one-third of
22. PLO chief Yassir Arafat reaffirmed as recently as 1980 that "[tihe destruction of Israel is the
goal of our struggle." P. 20.
23. Hannum & Lilich, The Concept of Autonomy in International Law, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 858
(1980).
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the population, the General Assembly was providing for future Jewish
immigration to Palestine. With the withdrawal of Great Britain as
Mandatory administrator, it was inevitable that the Jews would set them-
selves up a state. Perhaps the Palestinian Arabs should have done the
same. That they failed to do so is no argument against the wisdom or
legality of Israel's action.
The Palestinian Arabs would be better advised to stand on international
law as it is, and not as they would have it be. A scrupulous insistence on
the Mandate as furnishing the best title to Palestine, a recognition that
Israel has the same right to exist as any nation, a repudiation of terrorist
tactics aimed at innocent civilians, and a willingness to live in peace with
Jews in the Middle East would go far toward establishing the legitimacy
of the Palestinian claims to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
V. Stone's Statism
When one picks up a book by a scholar who has been an authority on
international law since 1930, one is entitled to expect something more
than a partisan plea. To be sure, Stone mentions the Mandate, but only
in passing.24 He also mentions, briefly, most of the other legal arguments
that have been advanced in support of the Palestinian position. When
those arguments are poor, Stone attacks them frontally; when they are
sound, he resorts to "fairness" in support of the Israeli position.
My principal objection to Stone's work, however, is of a different order.
He trades on an eighteenth-century conception that "inter-national law"
is a law solely and exclusively among sovereign nations. In that view only
nations have rights, duties, or standing. The journalists, politicians, and
public relations personnel who retain that older concept of international
law constitute Stone's target audience. To them he waves credentials, fes-
toons Latinisms, reiterates legal buzz words, and switches between law
and "fairness" with the ease of an amateur magician.
Professor Stone trades upon the veneer of legal respectability that exists
for the position that nations are the exclusive subjects of international law.
He ignores such crucial twentieth-century developments as the recognition
given to minority groups by the Permanent Court of International Justice
in the early 1920's,2" the status of international organizations and their
personnel,26 and the recent developments in the international law of
human rights that accord significant standing to individuals vis-a-vis gov-
24. Pp. 121-23, 132-33.
25. See N. FEINBERG, LA JURISDICTION DE LA COUR PERMANENTE DE JUSTICE DANS LE SYSTEME
DE LA PROTECTION INTERNATIONALE DES MINORITES 73-97 (1931).
26. See Advisory Opinion, Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations,
1949 I.C.J. 174.
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ernments.2" Stone's partisan purpose is transparent: the State of Israel is
to be considered an entity, entitled to a full and equal share of interna-
tional rights, whereas the Palestinian Arabs are a nondescript collection of
individuals causing trouble for the legitimate states of the Middle East.
Stone's position denies Palestinian Arabs both their human rights and
their status as a beneficiary of the Mandate regime. The position amounts
to a defense of statism, and herein lies its real danger. In the last few
years, Israeli policies have become increasingly expansionistic. Prime
Minister Begin has publicly expressed a desire to absorb the West Bank
and has annexed the Golan Heights. His armies presently occupy the
southern half of Lebanon. The post-World War II international legal or-
der was erected to stop this sort of territorial expansionism, but statist
policies can become intoxicating as they succeed. Statism can build up a
self-justifying momentum, though it truly constitutes an assault upon the
law of nations. For Professor Stone to justify a statist position so late in
the twentieth century is equivalent to Machiavelli's softly advising the
King to be more ruthless.
27. See H. LAUTERPRACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 3-19, 27-47, 61-72
(1950); D'Amato, The Concept of Human Rights in International Law, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1110
(1982).
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